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ABSTRACT
Generally, extant turnaround research has been
inductively based and has limited its conceptualization of
strategy to strategy content.

This study builds on past

research by incorporating strategy process and
theoretically deriving the causes of decline.

In general

terms, this study posits that fit (consistency) between
strategy process and content is critical to an
organization's ability to recover from poor performance.
Specifically, the following are considered consistent
responses: 1) an entrepreneurial strategy with
decentralized decision making and expanded information
usage; and, 2) an efficiency strategy with centralized
decision making and constricted information usage.
Additionally, organizations need to fit their strategy to
the cause of decline to have superior turnaround
performance.
This study examined the implications of strategy
content/process fit and strategy/cause of decline fit in
the hospital industry.

Specifically, archival data for

the years 1987-1994 was collected for the 131 Columbia/HCA
hospitals identified as in decline during 1988-1991.
Primary data was collected via questionnaire from 66 of
these hospitals.

Confirmatory factor analysis was used to

assess the reliability, variance extracted, and
discriminant validity of the measures collected by survey.
vi
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Moderated multiple regression failed to support the
positive performance implications of either type of fit.
Potential explanations for the lack of support for
the positive performance implications of fit were offered.
These explanations include: l) the choice of strategy is
not crucial to turnaround performance; 2) the two types of
fit are necessary but not sufficient for enhanced
performance; 3) turnaround processes are too idiosyncratic
to generalize; and, 4) a conceptualization of fit other
than the one posited in this study is more appropriate.
The limitations of this study include the number of
respondents per organization, limited statistical power,
limited generalizability of results, untested feedback
loops, and potential retrospective and survival biases.
This study concludes with suggestions for future research.
These suggestions involve the role of the environment,
organizational resources, and other strategy processes in
organizational turnaround.

vii
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CHAPTER Is INTRODUCTION
The desire to understand, predict and control
organizational performance guides much of strategy
research

(Summer et al., 1990).

Indeed, strategy can be

distinguished from other related disciplines by its
emphasis on organizational performance (Meyer, 1991).
Historically, strategy and other organizational sciences
have focused on positive performance, such as
organizational growth (Whetten, 1980a).
The topic of negative performance (i.e. ,
organizational decline) was ignored until the late 1970s
(Meyer, 1988) .

However, organizational decline has become

a widespread phenomenon (O'Neill, 1994); accordingly, the
quest to understand organizational decline and predict the
efficacy of strategic responses has become more urgent
(McKinley, 1993).

Consistent with this pursuit, this

study focuses on organizations that have experienced
declining performance and their efforts to reverse the
decline.
Before proceeding, it is instructive to delineate
this study's place within the organizational decline
research domain.

Organizational decline results from a

deterioration of an organization's adaptation to its
environment and refers to decreasing internal resources
over time

(Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988).

Although

there is some research that overlaps among levels of
1
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analysis (e.g., Staw, Sandelands & Dutton,

1981) or stages

of decline (e.g., Whetten, 1980b), the organizational
decline research domain can be classified along two
dimensions: 1) focal unit of analysis
(industry/population, organization or individuals) ; and,
2) stage of decline (antecedents or responses).
Illustrative references for this classification scheme are
shown in Table 1-1.
The organizational decline research domain
encompasses both antecedents and responses to
organizational decline (Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988).
Included in this domain are responses common, but not
limited, to declining organizations (e.g., downsizing -D'Aveni, 1989) .

Responses to organizational decline can

be further divided between descriptive responses

(e.g.,

D'Aunno & Sutton, 1992; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981;
Sutton & Callahan, 1987), and prescriptive responses
(e.g., Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hardy,

1987; Hofer,

19 80; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
Turnaround research fits in the firm-level
prescriptive-response category that can be further divided
into two types of research: 1) turnaround (e.g., Hambrick
& Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992;
Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976); and, 2) downsizing (e.g.,
Cascio, 1993).

Turnaround and downsizing research can be

distinguished from each other in two ways.

First,
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Table 1-1
Illustrative References for Classification of
Organizational Decline Research Domain

Industry/
Population

Organization

Individual

Antecedents
of
Decline

Environmental
Antecedents:
Hannan & Freeman,
1984; Zammuto &
Cameron, 1985

Organizational
Antecedents:
Starbuck &
Hedberg, 1977;
Whetten, 1980b

Individuals as
Antecedents:
Alexander,Fennell
Sc Halpern, 1 9 9 3 ;
Staw, 1976

Responses to
Decline:
Descriptive
Focus

Population
Responses:
Carroll &
Delacroix, 1982

Organizational
Responses:
DeWitt, 1993;
D'Aveni, 1989;
Freeman &
Cameron, 1993;
Staw, Sandelands
& Dutton, 1981

Individual
Responses:
Staw, Sandelands
& Dutton, 1981;
Sutton &
Callahan, 1987;
Brockner, Davey &
Carter, 1985

Responses to
Decline:
Prescriptive
Focus

Industry
Prescriptions:
Harrigan, 19 80;
Perry, 1986

Downsizing:
Cascio, 1993;
Turnaround:
Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983;
Schendel, Patton
& Riggs, 1976

Prescriptions for
Managing
Individuals:
Brockner, 1988;
Hardy, 19 87;
Rice Sc
Dreilinger, 1991

turnaround research is the study of organizations' efforts
to reverse performance decline.

Thus, by definition,

turnaround research is limited to companies that have
experienced declining performance (Hambrick & Schecter,
19 83).

In contrast, downsizing research is not;

downsizing is pursued by healthy and unhealthy companies
alike (Sutton & D'Aunno, 1989; Tomasko, 1987).
The second distinguishing characteristic between
downsizing and turnaround research is breadth of focus.
Downsizing studies have a narrow focus; they are concerned
with the impact of reducing the number of employees on
firm performance (D'Aveni, 1989) .

In contrast, turnaround

studies are concerned with reducing, increasing, or
changing a firm's scope of operations
Schecter,

(Hambrick &

1983) .

In summary, the present study is a turnaround study.
Its focus is on the efforts of declining organizations to
improve substandard performance.
Statement of Problem
Turnaround research generally has followed a pattern
set by the first turnaround study: Schendel, Patton and
Riggs (19 76) .

It has focused solely on strategy content

(the set of decisions regarding the goals, the range of
businesses in which the firm chooses to operate, and
competitive approaches used by these businesses -- Fahey &
Christensen,

1986), and has followed an inductive approach
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(based on observation of a particular sample rather than
on theoretical underpinnings -- Camerer,

1985).

The

exclusive focus of turnaround studies on strategy content
and the inductive nature of previous studies drives the
need for a model of turnaround that incorporates strategy
process (the activities leading to and supporting
strategic decisions --

Huff & Reger, 1987) and is based

on theory.
Despite an early recognition that strategy process
factors might explain differences in organizations'
abilities to improve declining performance

(Hambrick &

Schecter, 19 83), past turnaround research has neglected
process.

Failing to investigate the impact of strategy

process on a firm's ability to improve performance is a
key omission; process acts both independently (Huff &
Reger, 1987) and interacts with strategy content (Ketchen,
Thomas & McDaniel, 1996) as an important determinant of
firm performance.
Extant research has suggested that strategy process
may play an integral role in turnaround.

Indeed, it has

been speculated that the difference between success and
failure may be the means by which strategies are
implemented (Hoffman, 19 89) .

Research examining the

relationship between turnaround and changes in top
management group composition (e.g., Bibeault, 1982; Melin,
1985; O'Neill, 1986a; Zimmerman, 1986) has hinted at the
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importance of strategy formulation and implementation in
turnaround.
Although the main effects of strategy process would
warrant investigation, the strongest driving force of this
study is the interactive effects of strategy content and
process.

Generally, organizations that do not have

consistency between strategy content and process exhibit
lower performance than those organizations that do
(Ketchen, Thomas & McDaniel, 1996; Miles, Snow, Meyer &
Coleman, 1978).

However, there are several organizational

attributes associated with declining organizations

(e.g.,

increases in conflict, secrecy, scapegoating, rigidity,
and employee turnover -- Cameron, Whetten & Kim, 1987),
and the cause and effect relationships of healthy
organizations may not necessarily hold for declining
organizations (McKinley, 1993).

Thus, there is cause to

examine whether the positive performance implications of
achieving strategy content and process fit hold for
organizations trying to recover from decline.
As noted previously, turnaround research has been of
an inductive nature.

Thus, there is also a need to base

turnaround research on theory.

Past turnaround research

has shown that the strategy used in attempting to restore
performance should be matched to the cause of declining
performance (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) .

However, the

inductive nature of turnaround studies has prevented

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consistent conceptual treatment of the cause of decline in
turnaround studies.

Further, because their basis is not

in theory, the existing treatments of decline causes may
be inadequate.

This study addresses this limitation by

theoretically deriving

the causes of decline with

the

open-systems paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1966).
Significance of Study
This study's significance is that it examines the
role strategy content and process fit plays in turnaround.
As noted, most turnaround research has focused solely on
the role of strategy content.

This study extends prior

work by building a model that incorporates strategy
process and includes theoretically-derived causes of
performance decline.
This study
contributions.

offers the following two primary
First,

the importance

of strategy content

and process fit to turnaround performance is tested.
Research outside the organizational decline research
domain has stressed the positive performance implications
of fit between strategy process and content

(Miles, Snow,

Meyer & Coleman, 1978), yet this link remains untested in
the turnaround literature.
A widely-accepted notion of the strategy discipline
is that our research needs to have ultimate application to
the problems facing practitioners
& Balakrishnan,

(Montgomery, Wernerfelt

1989; Summer et a l ., 1990) .

This study

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ultimately could enhance the ability of practitioners to
improve organizational effectiveness.

If the positive

performance implications of strategy content and process
fit are supported by this study and future studies, the
discipline can suggest to practitioners that having
consistency between their strategy content and processes
may improve turnaround performance.

Failure to support

the positive performance implications of strategy content
and process fit may also assist practitioners by focusing
future research and, ultimately, identifying the issues
critical to improving organizational performance.
The study's second contribution is the potential
reconciliation of the conflicting predictions of the
efficacy of strategic responses.

Some authors have

suggested a company's road back to satisfactory
performance requires becoming more efficient in its
present operations

(e.g., Zimmerman, 1986).

However,

others have suggested that stressing efficiency leads only
to further deterioration (D'Aveni, 1989), and that
strategic reorientations

(i.e., relatively large changes

in strategy and structure -- Tushman & Romanelli, 1985)
are needed to restore a company's performance (Barker,
1992).

As detailed below, these conflicting predictions

may be reconciled by matching the cause of decline with
the appropriate strategy.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Past research has treated causes of decline as either
internal or external to the firm and has established the
performance implications of linking strategy to the cause
of decline (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) .

Specifically,

internal causes have been linked with an efficiency
strategy (i.e., becoming more efficient by focusing on
production and management systems -- Hambrick & Schecter,
1983; Robbins & Pearce, 1992), and external causes have
been linked with an entrepreneurial strategy (e.g.,
introducing new products, shifting to more desirable
niches -- Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; entering new
businesses -- Hofer, 1980).

The present study posits that

turnaround strategy should be matched with the cause of
decline, but derives the causes of decline using the opensysterns paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1966) .

Using the open-

systems paradigm as a theoretical basis, it would appear
that external causes may be too broad of a classification
(cf. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
Trying to resolve problems coming from the entire external
environment (i.e., both input and output environments)
with an entrepreneurial strategy would likely be
ineffective.

An entrepreneurial strategy focuses on

bringing the organization back into alignment solely with
the output environment.

Misalignment with the input

environment would not be corrected by an entrepreneurial
strategy.

Hence, our understanding of an organization's

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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ability to restore performance may be enhanced by relating
theoretically-derived causes of decline to the efficacy of
turnaround strategies.
Summary of Remaining Chapters
Chapter 1 has laid the foundation for this study by:
1) placing this study within the broader research domain
of organizational decline; 2) outlining the shortcomings
of existing turnaround research; and, 3) underscoring the
potential contributions of this study.

Specifically, the

present study improves on existing turnaround research by
incorporating strategy process and theoretically-derived
causes of decline into a model of turnaround performance.
Chapter 2 reviews extant literature on all the
building blocks of this study's model of turnaround.

In

the first section, previous turnaround studies are
surveyed for their treatment of strategy content.

In the

second section, the literature on two important aspects of
strategy process (i.e., information usage and
centralization of decision making) are reviewed.

Relevant

literature on fit between strategy process and content is
highlighted in the third section.

In the fourth section,

the treatment of the causes of declining performance in
extant turnaround research is reviewed, and the opensystems paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1966) is offered as a
theoretical basis for classifying causes.

Literature on

turnaround performance is reviewed in the final section.
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Chapter 3 (Model Development and Hypotheses) develops
a model depicting the positive performance implications
of: 1) achieving fit between strategy content and process;
and, 2) achieving fit between strategy and cause of
decline.

Hypotheses are developed for this model and

offered for testing.

Chapter 4 (Method) describes the

sample, sources of data, measures, method of data
collection, and statistical analyses used to test the
hypotheses.

Chapter 5 (Results) presents the results of

primary data collection, descriptive statistics for all
variables in the study, and results of the analyses used
to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4.

The final

chapter (Chapter 6 -- Discussion and Conclusion) reviews
the study's results, acknowledges this study's
limitations, and discusses avenues for future research.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, the extant literature on all the
constructs and the concept used to build a model of
organizational turnaround are reviewed.

The first section

of this chapter reviews, from a content perspective, the
conceptualizations of strategy used in previous turnaround
studies.

Next, attention turns to a review of strategy

process.

The literature on two important aspects of

strategy formulation (i.e., information usage and
centralization of decision making)

is reviewed.

Because

the central contribution of this study is the examination
of the role of fit between strategy content and process in
turnaround, the third section of this chapter specifies
the type of fit examined in this study and reviews the
relevant literature.
The efficacy of strategic responses is, in part,
determined by matching the response to the cause of
performance deterioration (Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

Thus,

the fourth section reviews the causes of performance
decline.

Because past turnaround research has used an

inductive method (i.e., based on observation -- Camerer,
19 85) for classifying causes of decline, the open-systems
paradigm is discussed as a theoretical basis for a new
classification scheme.
The objective of using recovery strategies is to
improve firm performance.

Thus, the last section reviews
12
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literature on turnaround performance.

In the next

chapter, strategy content, strategy process, cause of
performance decline, fit, and turnaround performance are
related in a model that provides the basis for predicting
turnaround performance.
Strategy Content
Strategy content is the set of decisions regarding
the goals, range of businesses in which the firm chooses
to operate, and competitive approaches used by these
businesses

(Fahey & Christensen, 1986) .

Strategy content

is the primary means by which an organization aligns
itself with its environment (Hrebiniak, Joyce & Snow,
1989), and thereby, enhances probability of survival.
Turnaround research has generally treated the content
of turnaround strategies as either "entrepreneurial" or
"efficiency"

(Pearce & Robbins, 1993).

An entrepreneurial

strategy involves doing different things, whereas an
efficiency strategy involves doing the same things more
efficiently (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).

The basic

distinction between these two types of strategies is
whether changes are made in a company's products or target
market; an efficiency strategy does not involve changes,
whereas an entrepreneurial strategy does

(Pearce &

Robbins, 1993) .
A brief history on this dichotomy is helpful in
understanding strategy content's role in turnaround.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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early studies (Hofer, 1980; Schendel, Patton & Riggs,
1976) established a dichotomy of responses to declining
performance.

This dichotomy was based on whether the

responses were considered either strategic or operational.
For example, changing marketing processes, entering new
businesses

(Hofer, 1980), vertically integrating,

diversifying, divesting, and changing top management
(Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976) were considered strategic
responses.

On the other hand, reducing costs, assets

(Hofer, 1980), and plant expenditures, improving the
operations of functional areas, and improving efficiency
(Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976) were considered
operational responses.

The basic distinction between

strategic and operating responses was whether the company
attempted to reverse declining performance by implementing
strategic changes or increasing efficiency.

Hence, these

strategies were named "entrepreneurial" and "efficiency"
by Hambrick and Schecter (1983).
Although both types of strategies may enhance
performance, companies experiencing decline are limited in
their ability (e.g., managerial and financial resources)
to respond to decline with both entrepreneurial and
efficiency strategies (Green, 1992; Pearce & Robbins,
1993; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) .

Instead,

organizations stress either one or the other of the
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strategies

(Green, 1992; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins &

Pearce, 1992) .
In summary, extant literature has identified two
types of strategies to reverse declining performance.

An

entrepreneurial strategy involves a change in a company's
products and target market

(Pearce & Robbins, 1993) and

focuses on products and market-based activities (Hambrick
& Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) .

An efficiency

strategy does not involve a change in a company's products
or target market (D'Aveni, 1989; Pearce & Robbins, 1993),
and focuses on production and management systems (Hambrick
& Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) .
Strategy Process
The strategy process includes strategy formulation
and implementation, and extant literature suggests that
how a firm's strategic decisions are formulated and
implemented may impact firm performance

(e.g., Dean &

Sharfman, 1996; Huff & Reger, 1987; Priem, Rasheed &
Kotulic, 1985) .

Declining performance is thought to

impact the formulation of strategies (Cameron, Whetten &
Kim, 1987; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981).

Thus, this

study focuses on strategy formulation because it not only
is an important determinant of organizational performance,
but also is affected by declining performance.
Strategy formulation is a sequence of behaviors where
decision makers scan the environment and gather
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information about important trends and events (Mintzberg,
1987) .

This definition is the basis for selecting the two

aspects of strategy formulation for examination in this
study (i.e., centralization of decision making and
information usage).

Centralization refers to the level(s)

at which decisions are made for the organization (Pugh,
Hickson, Hinings & Turner, 1968).

Centralization was

selected for examination because it fundamentally reflects
"who" makes the strategic decisions.

Information usage,

which refers to the quantity of data that organizations
gather and process in addressing strategic decisions

(Daft

& Macintosh, 19 81; Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993; Thomas &
McDaniel, 1990), was selected because it fundamentally
reflects how comprehensive an organization's information
gathering was during strategy formulation.
The selection of centralization of decision making
and information usage for further examination is supported
by the convergence of strategy research in general, extant
turnaround research, and organizational decline
literature.

The importance of information usage and

centralization of decision making to strategy formulation
has been supported by general strategy literature

(e.g.,

information usage -- Daft & Lengel, 19 86; Govindarajan,
1988; Ketchen, Thomas & McDaniel, 1996; Thomas, Clark &
Gioia, 1993; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990; centralization --
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Chandler, 1962; Govindarajan, 1988; Rumelt, 1974; Vancil,
1980) .
Although turnaround research involving strategy
formulation has been quite limited, it reiterates the same
two key aspects: 1) the decision makers; and, 2) the role
of information.

More specifically, research examining

changes in top management groups has shown that strategy
formulation is positively influenced by the new and
multiple perspectives of decision makers (Bibeault, 19 82;
Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986a).

Additionally, case studies

have highlighted the role of gathering large amounts of
information to interpret a changed environment (Zimmerman,
1986).
Organizational decline literature has also
highlighted the same two aspects of strategy formulation
(i.e., centralization of decision making and information
usage).

Organizational processes are posited to be

influenced by negative performance; more specifically,
information usage may decrease and decision making may
become more centralized in response to perceptions of poor
performance (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981).

However,

the responses of organizations may vary because top
managers in different organizations often construct
differing interpretations of the same strategic issue
(Meyer, 1982).

Based on these varying interpretations,

decision making may not become more centralized, and
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information usage may not decrease.

Clearly, a better

understanding of both information usage and centralization
of decision making is warranted.
Information usage.

Information usage is a vital

component of information processing (Thomas & McDaniel,
1990), and information processing plays an integral role
in allowing an organization to accomplish internal tasks,
coordinate diverse activities, and interpret the external
environment

(Daft & Lengel, 19 86).

This section begins by

reviewing research that highlights the role of information
usage in a firm's adaptation to its environment.

Then,

literature discussing the contingency nature of
information usage is summarized.
Managers gather information about the external
environment so that they can mediate between the external
environment and the organization to bring about fit among
strategy, structure and environment

(Andrews, 1971;

Mintzberg, 1978; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).

It is this

fit among strategy, structure, and environment that
enhances the probability of survival

(Andrews, 19 71).

Because environments often are changing (Tushman &
Romanelli,

1985), organizations must continually process

information to learn about and interpret their environment
to survive (Daft & Lengel, 19 86).
Previous literature posited that organizations have
different information requirements based on the situation
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(Daft & Lengel, 1986; Galbraith 1973; Hedberg, 1981).
High information usage is not desirable in every situation
because of the costs associated with acquiring and
processing information (Hedberg, 1981).

Thus, the

benefits of obtaining additional information must be
weighed against the costs.
The following contingency factors determine the
anticipated benefits of information usage: 1) environment
(Hedberg, 1981); 2) strategy (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990);
and, 3) changes in either environment or strategy
(Bartunek, 1988; Freeman & Cameron, 1993; Tichy & Devanna,
1986).

The first contingency factor is the environment.

Rapidly changing and complex environments involve great
uncertainty and ambiguity, whereas stable and simple
environments involve less uncertainty and ambiguity
(Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).

Because information reduces

uncertainty and ambiguity (Galbraith, 1973) , rapidly
changing and complex environments require much more
information than do slowly changing and simple
environments (Hedberg, 1981).
An organization's strategy also determines the amount
of information required.

Successful innovation involves

using large amounts of information (Monge, Cozzens, &
Contractor, 1992).

Thus, it follows that strategies

stressing innovation (e.g., differentiation -- Porter,

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20

1980) require large amounts of information (Govindarajan,
1988) .
Strategies involving domain expansion also require
large amounts of information.

The domain offense

strategy, which is marked by attempts to expand an
organization's domain through actions such as pursuing
additional markets

(Miles, 1982), requires higher levels

of communication due to the increasing administrative
functions

(Thomas & McDaniel, 1990) .

In contrast, domain

defense, which focuses on protecting an existing domain
through cultivating repeat customers (Miles, 1982), does
not require large amounts of information (Thomas &
McDaniel, 199 0).
Finally, the magnitude of change in either
environment or strategy is an important determinant of
information requirements.

Because a high level of

communication is required to help members understand new
situations

(e.g., a new strategy or changed external

environment -- Bartunek, 1988; Tichey & Devanna, 1986),
large changes in strategy or environment require more
information, interpretation (Daft & Lengel, 1986), and
extensive communication within the organization (Freeman &
Cameron, 1993).

In contrast, incremental changes in

environment or strategy require less extensive use of
information (Freeman & Cameron, 1993).
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In summary, information usage plays an integral role
in enabling organizational adaptation.

The amount of

information usage needed depends on an organization's
environment, strategy, and changes in either environment
or strategy.
Centralization of decision making.

A highly-

centralized organization has its strategic decisions made
by members of the top management group only; in contrast,
decisions are made throughout a highly-decentralized
organization.

Centralization is generally associated with

relatively slow decision making processes, high control
over operations,

inflexibility, and an efficiency focus.

In contrast, decentralization is associated with fast
decision making processes, low control over operations,
flexibility, and an effectiveness focus (Hage, 1965) .
Extant literature has posited a contingency
relationship between the appropriate level of
centralization and the following: 1) strategy (Thomas &
McDaniel, 1990); 2) change in strategy (Freeman & Cameron,
1993) ; and, 3) change in environment (Lawrence & Dyer,
19 83).

The first contingency factor is strategy.

Because

centralized decision making is best for efficiency and
control (Hage, 19 65), it enhances the performance of
organizations using strategies stressing efficiency
(Govindarajan, 1988).

Examples of strategies stressing

efficiency include cost-leadership (Porter, 19 80) and
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domain defense (Miles, 1982).

However, centralized

decision making's emphasis on efficiency and control
discourages innovation (Govindarajan, 1988; Monge, Cozzens
& Contractor, 1992) .

Thus, it hinders the performance of

organizations using strategies that stress innovation
(e.g., differentiation -- Porter, 1980; domain offense -Miles, 1982) .
Change in strategy is the second contingency factor.
Incremental changes require less participation in the
decision making process.

In contrast, large changes

require decentralized decision making for success (Freeman
& Cameron, 1993) .
The rate of environmental change is the final
contingency factor.

Rapidly changing environments require

more frequent adaptations for an organization to maintain
alignment with the environment (Tushman & Romanelli,
1985). Adaptiveness is enhanced by decentralization
because managers making decisions interact directly with
the environment,

resulting in more timely and effective

responses (Hage, 1965; Price, 1968).

Thus, decentralized

decision making enhances the performance of organizations
in rapidly-changing environments (Koberg, 19 87) .
Conversely, organizations in stable environments require
fewer changes to stay aligned with their environment
(Tushman & Romanelli,

1985) and, thus, are best served by

centralized decision making (Burns & Stalker,

1961).

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

In summary, information usage and centralization of
decision making are important to strategy processes in all
organizations(e.g., Chandler, 1962; Daft & Lengel, 1986;
Thomas & McDaniel,

1990; Vancil, 1980) and, especially, in

declining organizations (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981).
Extant literature has highlighted the contingency
relationships of information usage and centralization of
decision making.

High levels of information usage enhance

organization performance when the organization:

1)

operates in rapidly changing and complex environments
(Hedberg, 1981) ; 2) has adopted a strategy stressing
product innovation (Monge, Cozzens & Contractor, 1992) or
involving domain expansion (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990) ; or,
3) has experienced relatively large strategic or
environmental changes
Cameron, 1993).

(Daft & Lengel, 1986; Freeman &

Decentralized decision making enhances

organizational performance when the organization: 1) has
adopted a strategy stressing product innovation
(Govindarajan, 1988) ; 2) has experienced relatively large
strategic changes

(Freeman & Cameron, 1993); or, 3)

operates in a rapidly changing and uncertain environment
(Koberg, 1987) .
Fit
This section first establishes the conceptual
importance of fit.

Then, because statistical treatment

and theoretical conceptualization are necessarily
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interwoven (Venkatraman, 1989), attention turns to the
statistical treatment of fit.
Fit (also termed consistency or coalignment)
important concept in strategic management.

is an

The

performance implications of achieving fit among strategy,
structure and environment have long been established in
strategy research (e.g., Andrews, 1971; Chandler, 1962;
Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Miles & Snow,
1978; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).

Indeed, the extent

of fit between strategy and the external environment has a
significant positive impact on performance (Anderson &
Zeithaml, 1984; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).
Conversely, poor performance is an important indication
that a company's strategy does not fit its environment and
signals that changes may be necessary (Boeker & Goodstein,
1991).
Not only is fit between environment and strategy
important, but also fit between strategy content and
process is important.

Fit between strategy content and

process has positive performance implications (Miles &
Snow, 1978).

Miles and Snow's strategy typology (1978),

one of the discipline's foundational strategy typologies,
is based on the extent of fit between strategy process and
content.

Miles & Snow (1978) found that organizations are

faced with three interrelated problems

(one related to

strategy content and two related to strategy process) that
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must be solved with solutions that are consistent with
each other (Miles & Snow, 1978) .

The strategy content

problem is the determination of the product/service to be
produced and target market.

The other problems involve

strategy process, and include: 1) creating a system to
operationalize management's solution to the strategy
content problem; and, 2) establishing coordinating and
controlling internal processes relating to both past and
future strategic decisions (Miles & Snow, 1978).

To be

successful, an organization's solutions to these problems
must be consistent with each other.

Therefore, strategy

process and content should be tightly linked.
The conceptualization and statistical treatment of
fit are necessarily interwoven (Venkatraman, 1989) .

In

the strategy literature, fit generally has been approached
from one of two broadly-defined theoretical and
methodological perspectives: l) holistic; or 2)
reductionist

(Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990) .

The holistic

perspective is based on the premise that it is important
to retain the applicable constructs' multidimensional
nature, and is consistent with configurational research
(e.g., Ketchen, Thomas & Snow, 1993; Miller, 1981; Miller
& Friesen,

19 84).

This perspective does not focus on

linear relationships among independent variables and,
instead, focuses on whether performance varies across
different combinations (i.e., configurations) of
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independent variables.

Conversely, the reductionist

perspective generally focuses on linear relationships
among variables

(Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990), and, thus,

may provide evidence of causal relationships

(i.e., the

degree to which an independent variable impacts a
dependent variable -- Miller & Mintzberg,

1983).

As noted above, the statistical treatment and
theoretical conceptualization of fit are interwoven.
Thus, the theoretical conceptualization dictates the
statistical treatment.

The underlying theory of this

study is strategic choice.

The underlying assumptions of

strategic choice are that: 1) managers make decisions
regarding how organizations respond to environmental
conditions; and, 2) these decisions are critical
determinants of organizational outcomes

(Child, 1972).

Strategic choice is a descendent of contingency theory
(Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 19 85) , which asserts that there
is a relationship between two or more variables that
predicts a third variable (Schoonhoven, 1981) .

The type

of fit examined in this paper focuses on linear or
bivariate relationships and, thus, is approached with a
reductionist perspective (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).
Cause of Declining Performance
Although considering the cause of the performance
decline when assessing the efficacy of the recovery
strategy was proposed early in the research stream
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(Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976), this has not been done
consistently.

Turnaround studies have either: 1) ignored

the cause of declining performance (e.g., Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Schendel & Patton, 1976); 2)
not related the cause to the recovery strategy (e.g.,
Bibeault,

1982) ; 3) not distinguished among causes (e.g.,

Melin, 1985; O'Neill, 1986b); or, 4) inductively derived
the causes of decline (Robbins & Pearce, 19 92; Schendel,
Patton & Riggs, 1976).

This section first reviews

literature on cause of decline.

Then, literature that

serves as the foundation for a theoretically-based
classification scheme is reviewed.
Based on observation of turnaround firms, the first
turnaround study (Schendel, Patton & Riggs,

1976)

dichotomized causes of performance decline as either poor
strategy or poor operations.

Poor strategy was defined as

the inability to adapt to a changing environment, and poor
operations were defined as inefficient operations or poor
implementation of an otherwise sound strategy.
Specifically, decreased profit margins,

increased wages,

increased competition, and inadequate raw materials were
treated as indicators of poor strategy; depressed price
levels, recessions, strikes, labor problems, and excess
plant capacity were treated as indicators of poor
operations

(Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 19 76).

Strategic

responses were suggested to improve declining performance
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resulting from poor strategy, and operating responses were
suggested to improve downturns resulting from poor
operations (Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976).
A recent study (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) built on the
work of Schendel, Patton and Riggs

(19 76) and treated the

causes of decline as either internal or external to the
firm.

Robbins and Pearce (1992) found that an efficiency

strategy reversed performance declines caused by internal
causes, and an entrepreneurial strategy reversed
externally-caused performance problems.

Internal causes

included lack of operating control, overexpansion,
excessive leverage, and deficiencies in the top management
group.

External causes included economic problems,

competitive changes, technological changes, and social
changes (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) .
The distinction between internal and external causes
is intuitively appealing.

Although Robbins and Pearce

(1992) did not theoretically derive this dichotomy, a
possible theoretical basis for the distinction is the
conceptualization of organizations as open systems
Kahn, 1966).

(Katz &

However, as will be discussed below, an

open-systems view of the firm suggests that prescribing
the same turnaround strategy for all external causes may
be inappropriate.
The open-systems paradigm as a basis for classifying
causes.

The open-systems paradigm views the organization
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as highly dependent on its environment for the resources
necessary for its continued existence; in contrast, closed
systems view organizations as self-contained structures
that are independent of their environment (Katz & Kahn,
1966).

Open systems are characterized by three primary

functions: 1) importation of resources from the
environment; 2) Throughput of the resources within the
organization; and, 3) output of resources to the
environment.

Difficulties in performing any of the

functions can threaten the viability of the organization
(Katz & Kahn, 19 66) .

Thus, causes of decline can

originate in either the input or output environment, or
inside the firm.
Input-environmental causes focus on difficulties
involved in obtaining resources.

The environment is the

source of an organization's resources
Pfeffer & Salancik,

(Koberg, 1987;

1978), and one tenet of the open-

systems paradigm is that organizations must continue to
import resources to survive (Katz & Kahn, 1966).

Thus,

changes in the input environment are factors to which an
organization must adjust.

Changes that reduce the

availability of resources are especially noteworthy.
Scarcity typically increases the costs of resources, and
may limit the throughput and output of the organizations.
Thus, the impact of scarce resources on organizational
performance can be extreme (McKinley, 1987).

Examples of
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input-environmental causes, identified in a survey of
practitioners (Robbins & Pearce, 1992), include the
following: l) interest rate hikes; 2) credit squeezes;
and, 3) high or increasing prices of raw materials,
and labor.

energy

Lack of these or other key resources bring

about organizational decline.
In contrast, output-environmental causes of decline
focus on difficulties involved in exporting a firm's
output.

The output of resources

(that were imported and

then transformed within the organization) back to the
environment is the mechanism that allows for continued
importation of new energy

(Katz & Kahn, 1966).

In other

words, changes in the output environment may threaten an
organization's ability to sell its product/service.
Because revenues from the sales of products/services are
the means for obtaining future resources, changes in the
output environment may lead to declining performance.
Examples of output-environmental causes of decline,
identified by practitioners

(Robbins & Pearce, 1992) ,

include the following: 1) a competitor's new range of
products; and, 2) failure to react to changing lifestyles,
ages of the population, consumer attitudes, or consumer
tastes.
All external causes should not be treated in the same
manner (cf. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins & Pearce,
1992).

Changes in the input environment may create
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problems with regard to importing resources, whereas
changes in the output environment may create problems
associated with selling products.

This distinction is

important because of the different responses required: 1)
changes in an organization's strategic orientation (i.e.,
the business an organization is in and method with which
it competes -- Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) are required by
changes in the output environment (e.g., changes in demand
or product users); and, 2) changes in an organization's
processes and structure are necessitated by changes in the
input environment (e.g., reductions in resource
munificence -- Yasai-Ardekani, 1989).

Thus, external

causes should be treated as coming from either the input
or output environments.
Research has shown the wisdom of dichotomizing the
environmental causes of decline as input- and outputenvironmental; for example, D'Aveni & MacMillan (1990)
found that companies focusing attention on the input
environment when the problem was in the output environment
were more likely to fail.

Specifically, in responding to

severely declining demand, companies that focused more
attention on the factors related to the output environment
(e.g., customer needs and changing demand) than on factors
related to the input environment were successful.
The cause of performance decline may also be internal
to the organization.

In the long term, organizations
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survive only if they import more resources than they
expend in the processes of transformation and exportation
(Katz & Kahn, 1966).

Hence, unless resources are

overabundant, organizations must be efficiently organized
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

Therefore, attention to

internal causes is appropriate.

Examples of internal

causes of decline include: l) inadequate or misguided
control systems; 2) inefficient organization; 3) excessive
financial leverage; and, 4) inefficient manufacturing
techniques

(Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

In summary, little attention has been paid to the
causes of decline in the existing literature.

Even less

effort has been devoted to constructing the theoretical
basis for understanding the cause of decline.

Research

has been inductive in nature; hence, little consistency
across studies has been noted.

Based on the open-systems

paradigm, causes can be classified as to their origin in
either the input or output environments, or internal to
the firm.

The benefits of this theoretically-derived

treatment are twofold: 1) because it is based on theory,
the conceptual treatment can be consistent across future
studies; and, 2) due to their different foci, factors from
the input and output environments are conceptually
distinct, and this classification system treats them
accordingly.
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Turnaround Performance
As noted in Chapter l, Strategy's emphasis on firm
performance distinguishes it from related disciplines
(Meyer, 1991).

Further, the turnaround research stream's

emphasis on improving firm performance distinguishes it
from the vast majority of the other organizational decline
literature.

Performance has been defined as the economic

and social outcomes associated with organizational actions
(Hrebiniak, Joyce & Snow, 1989), and can be conceptualized
in terms of financial, operational, or organizational
effectiveness outcomes (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986) .
Financial outcomes refer to the accounting-based
indicators assumed to reflect fulfillment of an
organization's economic goals.

Operational outcomes refer

to nonfinancial indicators (e.g., market share, hospital
occupancy) of an organization's operating performance.
Finally, organizational effectiveness refers to the degree
to which the organization satisfies the multiple,
conflicting goals of its stakeholders

(Venkatraman &

Ramanujam, 1986) .
Although operational dimensions have received some
attention (e.g., market position -- Hofer, 1980;
Zimmerman, 1986), most turnaround research has focused on
financial outcomes (Hoffman, 1989).

This emphasis may be

due to the relationship between financial performance and
organizational survival: without an acceptable level of
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financial performance, an organization will fail in the
long term (Porter, 1980).
Turnaround research has used various referents. The
performance referents used have included: 1) industry
profits

(O'Neill, 1981; Pant, 1991; Robbins & Pearce,

1992); 2) changes in Gross National Product (Schendel &
Patton, 1976; Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976); 3) returns
of riskless investments such as government securities
(Barker, 1992); 4) predownturn profitability levels
(Robbins & Pearce,

1992); and, 5) seemingly arbitrary

benchmarks (return on investment greater than 20% -Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).

Of the various referents,

only the return from riskless investments has its basis in
theory.

Returns on riskless investments serve as a

conservative approximation of risk-adjusted rates of
return, and organizations cannot survive as economic
entities if they do not earn at least a risk-adjusted rate
of return for their owners (Porter, 1980).
In sum, turnaround performance is an organization's
performance following its declining performance.
Turnaround performance has been examined primarily along
the financial dimension of performance, and successful
turnaround performance requires that organizations earn
returns greater than the risk-free rate.
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Summary
This chapter began with a review of strategy content
in turnaround literature that identified two types of
strategies: 1) entrepreneurial, which involve changes in a
company's products or target market; and, 2) efficiency,
which involve becoming more efficient in producing the
same products for the same market.
Next, literature highlighting information usage and
centralization of decision making as important aspects of
strategy process was reviewed.

Additionally, the

contingency nature of information usage and centralization
was emphasized.

Increased information usage is required

by: 1) changing and complex environments; 2) strategies
characterized by changing or expanding product lines and
target markets; or, 3) large changes in either environment
or strategy.

Decentralized decision making is more

appropriate when: 1) the organization's strategy stresses
innovation; 2) there is a large change in strategy; or, 3)
the environment is turbulent or uncertain.
The literature on fit was also reviewed, showing that
fit between strategy process and content, and fit between
strategy and cause of decline are important determinants
of performance.

Additionally, the reductionist

perspective, and the related statistical treatment, were
identified as appropriate for this study.
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The fourth section reviewed the causes of performance
decline.

Based on the open-systems paradigm, causes can

be considered as originating in the input or output
environments, or internal to the firm.

In the last

section, the literature on turnaround performance was
reviewed.

Turnaround performance is the performance of a

firm following declining performance and consists of
financial, operating, and effectiveness dimensions.
This chapter has served to highlight both the state
of knowledge about turnaround and the gaps in knowledge.
Regarding the former, researchers generally agree that: 1)
companies use either an entrepreneurial or efficiency
turnaround strategy; 2) information usage and
centralization of decision making are important aspects of
strategy process and exhibit a relationship with
organizational performance that is contingent on strategy
and environment; 3) generally, consistency between
strategy content and process has positive performance
implications; 4) turnaround performance is
multidimensional; and, 5) the cause of performance decline
should be accounted for in assessing the efficacy of
turnaround strategies.
Turning to the gaps in knowledge about turnaround,
the relationship linking strategy content and process fit
to turnaround performance has not yet been tested.
Further, the cause of performance decline has not been
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consistently treated across past studies, and the
performance implications of achieving fit between strategy
and the theoretically-derived causes of decline proposed
in this study have not been assessed.
In the next chapter, a model is developed that
predicts the following relationships: 1) fit between
strategy content and process is an important determinant
of turnaround performance; and, 2) the closer a firm's
recovery strategy fits the cause of performance decline,
the better its turnaround performance.
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
The last chapter reviewed literature on the four
constructs

(strategy content, strategy process, cause of

performance decline, and turnaround performance) and the
concept

(fit) that are used to develop a model of

turnaround performance.

In this chapter, these constructs

and concept are integrated into a model that suggests that
fit between strategy process and content is a key
determinant of turnaround performance.

Because matching

the strategy to the cause of decline determines the
efficacy of strategic responses, cause of decline is
included in the model as a contextual antecedent.
In the first section of this chapter, a proposition
relating fit between strategy content and process to
turnaround performance is developed, and testable
hypotheses related to this proposition are offered.

Next,

a proposition about the positive benefits of tailoring
turnaround strategy to the cause of decline is developed,
and testable hypotheses are offered.
Fit and Turnaround Performance
Strategy content and process are unavoidably
intertwined.

The conceptualization of strategy as a

firm's pattern of strategic decisions over time
(Mintzberg, 1987) emphasizes the manner in which strategy
content influences subsequent strategy processes.

An

organization may begin its existence by making strategy
38

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

content decisions (e.g., choosing its domain and method
for developing competitive advantage) based on basic
causal maps of the environment and organization (Andrews,
1971).

However, the outcomes associated with the original

and subsequent strategy content decisions are retained in
organizational memory (Milliken & Lant,
Ungson,

1991) .

1991;Walsh &

Organizational memory contains the revised

set of causal maps, and determines the collection,
analysis, and interpretation of data.

Consequently,

organizational memory influences subsequent actions
1984).

(Hall,

Thus, a key to understanding a firm's present

strategic processes is understanding its history of
previous strategy content decisions

(Ketchen, Thomas &

McDaniel, 1996).
Strategy processes not only lag past strategy content
decisions but also lead future decisions
1978).

(Miles & Snow,

The content of a firm's strategy limits strategic

decision making processes (Daft & Weick,

1984).

Subsequently, processes activated for making strategic
decisions about the future are constrained by the
mechanisms in place to achieve existing strategic goals.
Thus, the interpretation of a firm's current strategic
options is a reflection of the strategic processes and
content embodied in its past strategic decisions (Milliken
& Lant, 1991).
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Strategy process and content are interwoven
conceptually (Huff & Reger, 1987) and temporally (Miller &
Friesen, 1983).

An implication of this tight linkage is

that process/content fit may influence performance by
expediting (or hindering) internal coordination and
adaptation to the demands of the environment
Thomas & McDaniel, 1996) .

(Ketchen,

Thus, process/content fit is an

important determinant of firm performance.

Although the

interaction between strategy content and process has
received scant attention in the turnaround literature,
case study research noted that process and content ought
to act coherently in a turnaround (Zimmerman, 1986).
Accordingly, the model presented in Figure 3-1 begins with
an overall expectation that:
Proposition 1: Fit between strategy process and
content will be positively related to turnaround
performance.

Strategy Process
Cause
Fit
Decline

Turnaround
Performance

Figure 3-1
A General Model of Turnaround
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The general prediction of the positive performance
implications of strategy process/content fit suggests that
relationships exist among performance and specific
strategy content and process variables.

Thus, attention

turns to developing these relationships.
Strategy content and information usage.

As noted in

Chapter 2, information usage (i.e., the quantity of data
that organizations gather and process in addressing
strategic decisions -- Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Thomas &
McDaniel, 1990) plays an important role in strategy
formulation.

Information usage influences an

organization's interpretation of environmental events
(Thomas & McDaniel,

1990).

In turn, interpretation (the

process of translating data into knowledge and
understanding -- Daft & Weick, 1984), ultimately affects
organizational actions

(Dutton, Fahey & Narayanan, 19 83)

and performance (Thomas, Clark & Gioia,

1993) . Thus,

information usage ultimately plays a key role in
organizational actions and performance.
Because organizations are dependent on the
environment for resources

(Katz & Kahn, 1966),

organizations must process information to learn about and
interpret their environment to survive (Daft & Lengel,
1986).

However, the costs of obtaining information can be

high (Hedberg, 1981), and a firm's information usage
requirements are based on its strategy (Thomas & McDaniel,
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1990).

Thus,

it is reasonable to expect that

organizations have different information requirements
based on the strategy used to respond to declining
performance.
Based on the nature of an entrepreneurial strategy,
it appears there would be a fit between high levels of
information usage and an entrepreneurial strategy.

An

entrepreneurial strategy involves changes in a company's
products and/or target market (Pearce & Robbins,
focuses on products and market-based activities
Sc

1993) and
(Hambrick

Schecter, 1983) . More specifically, an entrepreneurial

strategy includes product changes, shifting to more
desirable niches
new businesses

(Hambrick & Schecter, 1983), or entering

(Hofer, 19 80).

Thus, an entrepreneurial

strategy reflects ambiguity and uncertainty regarding
consumer reaction to product or target market changes as
well as high levels of product/service innovation.
Changes involving relatively high levels of
uncertainty or ambiguity require that an organization
process large amounts of information before decision
makers in the organization are willing to act (Huber,
O'Connell, & Cummings, 1975) .

The amount of data gathered

reflects an organization's perceived level of
understanding of a situation (MacKay, 1969; Tushman &
Nadler, 19 78), and large amounts of information give
decision makers a more complete understanding of causal
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relationships (Thompson, 19 67) .

Gathering large amounts

of information enables decision makers to make faster
decisions, and decision making speed is of the essence for
companies facing rapid, discontinuous changes in demand,
competition, or product component technology (Eisenhardt &
Bourgeois, 1988).

Thus, the uncertainty and ambiguity

involved with an entrepreneurial strategy require that the
organization gather large amounts of information to speed
decision making and, thereby, enhance organizational
performance.
Further, the high level of product/service innovation
and the increase in product/service diversity associated
with an entrepreneurial strategy require large amounts of
information.

Successful product/service innovation

depends on high levels of information usage (Monge,
Cozzens & Contractor, 1992).

Further, increased

product/service diversity increases administrative and
technological complexity; to cope, organizations must
process large amounts of information (Thomas & McDaniel,
1990).

Hence, an entrepreneurial strategy and information

usage are expected to be related in the following manner:
Hypothesis la: For organizations choosing an
entrepreneurial strategy in response to decline,
the amount of information usage will be
positively related to turnaround performance.
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An efficiency strategy does not involve
product/service or target market changes (D'Aveni, 1989;
Pearce & Robbins, 1993), but, instead, focus on a
company's production and management systems
Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993).

(Hambrick &

Typical

activities associated with an efficiency strategy include
cost cutting and selling assets (Hambrick & Schecter,
1983; Hofer, 1980) .

An efficiency strategy is most like a

domain defense strategy.

Organizations following a domain

defense strategy use less information because their
administrative functions are more efficient and
standardized (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990).
An efficiency strategy is incremental in nature.
Because of the relatively low ambiguity and uncertainty
surrounding small changes (Huber, O'Connell & Cummings,
1975), incremental changes require less information usage
(Freeman & Cameron,

1993).

Further, an efficiency

strategy requires little product/service innovation, and,
hence, do not require high levels of information usage
(Monge, Cozzens & Contractor, 1992).
There are substantial financial costs, as well as
opportunity costs, associated with acquiring information
(Hedberg, 1981) .

Because of these costs, procuring large

amounts of information is inconsistent with an efficiency
strategy; the increased costs are not justified by the
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demands of the strategy.

Thus, the following relationship

is expected:
Hypothesis lb: For organizations choosing an
efficiency strategy in response to decline, the
amount of information usage will be negatively
related to turnaround performance.
Strategy content and centralization of decision
making.

Centralization of decision making refers to the

level at which decisions are made for the organization
(Jennergren, 1981).

Centralized decision making is

associated with high control over operations,
inflexibility, and an efficiency focus; in contrast,
decentralized decision making is associated with low
control over operations, flexibility, and an effectiveness
focus (Hage, 19 65) .

The two types of turnaround

strategies differ concerning the desired amount of control
and flexibility, and their focus on efficiency or
effectiveness.

Thus, it is reasonable to expect that

different levels of centralization fit with the two types
of turnaround strategy.
Centralization of decision making inhibits strategic
experimentation, hinders accurate interpretation of the
marketplace, and drives away innovative employees.
Specifically, centralization places responsibility for
decision making with the highest managers in the
hierarchy, who may be more isolated from the realities of
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the marketplace (Starbuck, Greve & Hedberg, 1978).
Further, centralization discourages lower-level employees
from adopting innovations or changes that they perceive
will reverse the decline (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton,
1981).

Thus, centralization hinders an organization's

ability to introduce product/service innovations.

Because

the ability to introduce product/service innovation is a
particularly important ability for organizations choosing
an entrepreneurial strategy, it is predicted that:
Hypothesis lc: For organizations choosing an
entrepreneurial strategy in response to decline,
centralization of decision making will be negatively
related to turnaround performance.
The costs associated with centralized decision making
are high for organizations adapting to rapid and
discontinuous changes in demand, competitors, and product
technology (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,

1988).

However, this

relationship may not hold in situations where rapid
product changes are not required (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt,
1987, 1988).

Indeed, because an efficiency strategy does

not stress product innovation, the decreased ability to
introduce product innovations associated with
centralization would have little negative impact.
Conversely, centralization enhances control over
costs and is positively related to efficiency gains in an
organization's present operations

(Huber, Miller & Glick,

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

1990) .

Thus, the benefits of highly centralized decision

making would enhance organizational performance for those
organizations using an efficiency strategy.

Hence, the

following hypothesis:
Hypothesis Id: For organizations using an
efficiency strategy in response to decline,
centralization of decision making will be
positively related to turnaround performance.
Cause of Performance Decline: The Context of Turnaround
An organization's strategy provides a framework
within which its managers understand their environment and
interpret strategic issues (Hambrick, 1981; Meyer, 1982;
Thomas & McDaniel, 1990).

Strategy serves as an

information filter separating the critical from
insignificant (Huff, 1982).

Specifically, an

organization's top managers focus on information needed to
execute its strategy and ignore information that seems
irrelevant

(Hambrick, 1981).

The foci of turnaround strategies differ; an
efficiency strategy is input-environment (on a company's
procurement systems) and internally focused (on a
company's production and manufacturing systems -- Hambrick
Sc

Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993).

In contrast,

an entrepreneurial strategy is output-environmentally
focused (on a firm's products and market-based activities
-- Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
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Thus, turnaround strategies focus managers' attention on
different aspects of the environment or on the internal
processes of the organization.
Because strategy directs organizational attention to
specific aspects of the environment, matching the strategy
to the cause of decline becomes imperative.

An

organization's efforts should focus on matching its
strategy with the cause of decline, else attention will be
diverted away from the true problem (D'Aveni & MacMillan,
1990) .

If attention is diverted away from the true

problem, continued decline is likely.

Hence, the model of

turnaround performance (Figure 3-1) also is built on a
second general proposition:
Proposition 2: The closer a firm's recovery
strategy matches the cause of performance
decline, the better its turnaround performance.
The general prediction of the positive implications
of achieving fit between strategy and cause of decline
suggests that relationships exist among specific
strategies and causes of decline.

Hence attention turns

to developing these relationships.
Input-environmental causes of decline.

The

environment is the source of the resources an organization
needs to survive (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Koberg, 1987; Pfeffer
Sc

Salancik,

19 78) . Thus, anything interfering with the

importation of resources may cause performance decline.
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Changes in the input environment may change the way
an organization acquires resources (Katz & Kahn, 1966),
but do not alter the basic relationship between the
organization and its output environment.

An

entrepreneurial strategy focuses managerial attention on
the output environment.

Thus, an entrepreneurial strategy

would divert attention from the cause of decline, and,
thus, not fit with input environmental causes of decline
to reverse the decline.
In contrast, an efficiency strategy focuses
managerial attention on a firm's internal processes and
procurement systems.

Thus, the likelihood of management

effectively dealing with the impact of changes in the
input environment is increased by the adoption of an
efficiency strategy.

Input-environmental causes of

decline (such as increasing resource prices -- Robbins &
Pearce, 1992) effectively raise the costs of production
unless countered by changes in an organization's
production systems.

By becoming more efficient,

organizations reduce their dependence on a resource
(Thompson, 1967).

Thus, because of its focus on the input

environment and production systems, an efficiency strategy
can reduce the impact of scarcity and increasing costs of
resources.

Hence, the following hypothesis is offered:

Hypothesis 2a: To the extent that an
organization's decline is related to input -
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environmental factors, an efficiency strategy
will lead to positive turnaround performance.
Internal causes of decline.

All organizations

survive over the long term only if they import more
resources than they expend (Katz & Kahn, 1966); therefore,
organizations must be efficiently organized and operated
to be successful.

However, not all organizations are

efficiently organized and operated.

Thus, decline may

originate from within an organization.

Examples of

internal causes of decline include inefficient growth,
excessive leverage, lack of control, and high production
costs

(Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
As noted earlier, strategy directs the attention of

decision makers.

An entrepreneurial strategy is thought

to focus attention on the output environment.

Thus, an

entrepreneurial strategy likely would be ineffective in
countering internal causes of decline.

Instead, because

the inherent problem associated with internal factors is
inefficiency (Robbins & Pearce, 1992), an efficiency
strategy with its internal focus would be more successful.
Hence, the following relationship is predicted:
Hypothesis 2b: To the extent that an
organization's decline is related to internal
factors, an efficiency strategy will lead to
positive turnaround performance.
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Output-environmental causes of decline.

The

exportation of products is the mechanism that allows for
continued importation of new energy (Katz & Kahn, 1966).
Thus, changes in the output environment that threaten the
ability of the organization to export its products to the
environment can lead to declining performance.
changes in the output environment

Indeed,

(e.g., declining demand)

are often threats to organizational survival

(Harrigan,

1980; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985) .
To the extent that a cause of decline originated in
the output environment, an efficiency strategy misdirects
management's attention to internal production and
coordination systems and the input-environment.

Hence,

the misdirected focus of an efficiency strategy may be
lethal.
On the other hand, an entrepreneurial strategy
focuses management's attention on the output environment,
and the changes that organizations need to make.
Organizations with an external orientation are better able
to respond to competitors (Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993).
Changes in product demand and product users (i.e., outputenvironment factors) drive changes in an organization's
strategic orientation (the business the organization is in
and the method with which it competes) if the organization
is to survive

(Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) .

Thus,

declining performance caused by output-environment factors

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

should be countered with an entrepreneurial strategy.
Hence, the following relationship is predicted:
Hypothesis 2c: To the extent that an
organization's decline is related to outputenvironmental factors, an entrepreneurial
strategy will lead to positive turnaround
performance.
Summary
This chapter developed a model of turnaround
performance and accompanying propositions and hypotheses.
The first section focused on developing the positive
performance implications of strategy content and process
fit.

The second section focused on developing the

positive performance implications of fitting the
turnaround strategies to the cause of decline.

An

efficiency strategy is appropriate for addressing
performance declines caused by either input-environmental
factors or internal factors. In contrast, an
entrepreneurial strategy is appropriate for addressing
performance declines caused by output-environmental
factors.

The predictions articulated in this chapter were

tested using the methodology outlined in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD
In this chapter, the research design used to test the
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 is described.
chapter is organized as follows.
data sources are described.

This

First, the sample and

Then, descriptions of the

measures used and the data collection procedures are
presented.

Finally,

the statistical analyses used to

examine the hypotheses are detailed.
At several points during this research, experts, both
practitioners and academics, were consulted to help
address important methodological issues.

These

interactions are detailed where appropriate.
Sample and Data
Organizations in a single industry were chosen as the
setting for this study.
this choice.

First,

Several considerations underlay

the restriction to a single industry

ensured that industry effects on firm-level performance
were not confused with the performance effects of interest
(Dess, Ireland & Hitt, 1990).

Second, it was desirable to

examine a setting in which: 1) reliable and longitudinal
data were available; and, 2) appropriate measures could be
found for all modeled constructs.

Given these

requirements, the hospital industry was selected.
Before 1983, third-party payers reimbursed hospitals
for the full costs of patient care from third-party
payers.

However, legislation limiting reimbursements to
53
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hospitals

(i.e., the Medicare Prospective Payment System)

was fully implemented in 1986.

Over an extended period,

the impact of this legislation was a dramatic downward
shift in profitability (Guterman & Dobson, 1986).

Thus,

besides available, reliable and longitudinal data, there
is evidence that this industry experienced major
environmental changes which resulted in declining
performance for many incumbents

(Johnson & Johnson, 19 86;

Shortell, Morrison & Friedman, 1990).
Drawing a sample from the entire hospital industry
was not feasible due to the costs and other practical
concerns (e.g., likelihood of obtaining responses).
Hence, the sample was drawn from the 325 hospitals owned
by Columbia/HCA.

Columbia/HCA is the largest U.S.

hospital system (Lutz, 1995) and twelfth-largest employer
in the United States (Lutz, 1994) .

Columbia/HCA was

chosen because of its size and multi-state distribution of
hospitals.
The sample of declining hospitals was selected from
between the years of 1988-1991.

These years were selected

because they were the most recent years from which to
obtain a sample yet allow sufficient time to observe
performance turnaround.
through 1994

Performance data was collected

(the most recent archival data available).

Since the average time for an organization to turnaround
is three years

(Hoffman, 1989), it is reasonable to assume
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that this period is sufficient to observe the performance
implications of strategic responses.
As noted in Chapter 1, organizational decline is
defined as decreasing internal resources (Cameron, Sutton
& Whetten, 1988).

Thus, to be included in this sample,

hospitals experienced: 1) a return on assets

(ROA) of less

than the risk-free rate of return for at least two
continuous years; and, 2) at least one year of net loss.
The first criterion ensured that each hospital's poor
performance was over an extended period, and not a oneyear aberration.

As noted in Chapter 2, organizations not

producing returns that are at least equal to the riskadjusted rate of return are failing in an economic sense
(Porter, 1980).

Since the risk-adjusted rate of return is

higher, the risk-free rate served as a conservative
criterion for sample inclusion (Barker, 1992) .

The second

criterion ensured that each hospital had, in fact,
experienced a reduction of resources.

A net loss

fundamentally represents an organization's inability to
recoup all the costs of producing its services and, thus,
reflects declining internal resources (Barker, 1992).

To

ensure that these criteria were consistent with those used
by practitioners,
consulted.
criteria.

three hospital executives were

The three executives concurred with these
Of the 325 hospitals owned by Columbia/HCA,

met the guidelines for inclusion in the sample.
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Archival data was collected for the years 19 87-1994.
It was obtained from the Center for Healthcare Industry
Performance Studies (CHIPS), and the American Hospital
Association's annual Guide to the Health Care Field (AHA
Guide) .

Primary data was obtained through questionnaires

distributed to a top manager from each hospital.
Measures
Four control variables were measured beyond the
variables corresponding to constructs in the model.

The

discussion of these control variables is followed by
discussions of the independent and dependent measures.

To

help ensure the validity of the archival measures, a panel
of three researchers, who specialize in health care
issues, and a former hospital consultant reviewed the
archival measures for face validity.

Tables 4-1, 4-2, 4-

3, 4-4, and 4-5 list the measures and data sources for
each variable in the study.
Control variables.

Three control variables relating

to organizational characteristics specific to the hospital
industry and one control variable required by the sampling
method were used in this study.

First, there are three

organizational characteristics that have been found to
predict hospital performance including: 1) size

(Molinari,

Morlock, Alexander & Lyles, 1993; Ozcan & Luke, 1993); 2)
outpatient service mix (Goes & Zhan, 1995); and, 3)
Medicare and Medicaid intensity (Goes & Zhan, 1995) .
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These organizational characteristics were included in the
study to control for their potential confounding effects.
As shown in Table 4-1, this study measured size as
number of hospital beds.

The number of beds is a well-

established, widely-accepted measure of size (e.g.,
Alexander & Amburgey, 1987; Ginn, 1990; Provan, 1991) that
is robust across locations

(e.g., rural or metropolitan).

Outpatient service mix was measured as the ratio of
outpatient revenues to total revenues.

Medicare and

Medicaid intensity was measured as the percent of total
hospital days accounted for by the Medicare and Medicaid
payment mechanisms.
Table 4-1
Control Variables

VARIABLE
Size

MEASURE

DATA
SOURCE

Total number of hospital
beds

CHIPS

Outpatient Service
Mix

Ratio of outpatient
revenues to total revenues

CHIPS

Medicare and
Medicaid Intensity

Ratio of Medicare and
Medicaid hospital days to
total hospital days

CHIPS

Prior Performance

ROA in the third year prior
to the year of sample
inclusion

CHIPS

Besides the organizational characteristics discussed
previously,

this study also accounted for the potential

performance effects of the extent and length of decline by
accounting for the organization's prior performance.
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noted previously, the criteria for sample inclusion
ensured that an organization's poor performance was over
an extended period, and that the organization experienced
a reduction of resources.

However, these criteria did not

preclude varied lengths of decline.

For example, an

organization may have experienced multiple years of sub
risk-free ROA before having one year of negative profit or
may have had poor performance before 1988.

Ideally, the

number of years a hospital was in decline could be
measured and included as a control variable.

However,

this was precluded because performance data prior to 1987
was unavailable from CHIPS and there was no other suitable
source for this data.

Thus, instead of directly measuring

the length of decline, this study included the
organization's ROA in the third year prior to the year of
sample inclusion as a control variable.

Although this

control variable is probably less accurate than the number
of years a hospital was in decline, this variable
indicates if the hospital was in decline as well as the
extent of that decline prior to sample inclusion.
Strategy Content. Strategy content was measured with
the weighted change in service offerings and change in the
routine days percentage.

The weighted change in service

offerings was computed using a system developed by
Hambrick (19 81) and has been used in several other
hospital industry studies (e.g., Ketchen, Thomas &
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McDaniel, 1996; Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993; Thomas &
McDaniel, 1990).

A list of services offered by individual

hospitals is printed annually in the AHA Guide.

Using

this list, a profile of changes in product/service
offerings between the year of and three years after sample
inclusion was compiled for each hospital.

A high adoption

of new service offerings indicates that the hospital added
new products and services and, thus, adopted an
entrepreneurial strategy.

Conversely, a low score on this

measure indicates that the hospital did not adopt new
service offerings and, instead, adopted an efficiency
strategy.
Table 4-2
Operationalization of Strategy Content

VARIABLE
Turnaround
Strategy

DATA
SOURCE

MEASURE
Weighted change in
service offerings

AHA Guide

Change in routine days
percentage

CHIPS

The second measure of strategy content is the change
in routine patient days as a percentage of total patient
days

(Ketchen, Thomas & Snow, 1993).

Hospital services

can be categorized as routine (e.g., radiology, pharmacy)
or nonroutine (e.g., neonatal and burn care units).
Hospitals seeking to exploit new service opportunities
have a relatively large percentage of patients in

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60

nonroutine service units (Shortell, Morrison & Freidman,
1990).

In contrast, hospitals focusing on efficiency

ignore the opportunities presented by nonroutine services,
and instead concentrate on offering routine services
efficiently

(Meyer, 1982).

A decreasing ratio of routine

to total days indicates that a hospital added or
emphasized nonroutine services and, thus, adopted an
entrepreneurial strategy.

In contrast, a stable or

increasing ratio indicates that a hospital emphasized
efficiency in its current services rather than service
innovations.

Thus, a stable or increasing ratio indicates

an efficiency strategy.
Strategy process.

Averaged five-point Likert scale

responses are the measures of strategy process variables
(see Table 4-3).

The scale to measure centralization of

decision making was adapted from the scales used by
Inkson, Pugh and Hickson (19 70) and Thomas and McDaniel
(1990).

Originally, the centralization of decision making

scale consisted of six items; however, as discussed in
Chapter 5, the scale was reduced to four items because of
low loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis.
A scale to measure information usage was not
available.

Thus, a new scale was developed.

Items were

validated by the practitioners with which the
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questionnaire was pretested.

The information usage scale

consisted of fifteen items.
Table 4-3
Operationalization of Strategy Process
VARIABLE

MEASURE

DATA SOURCE

Information
Usage

Average of Likert
scale responses

Questionnaire

Centralization of
Decision
Making

Average of Likert
scale responses

Questionnaire

Cause of decline.

Because using archival data is

more valid than using perceptual data when a study's
objective is understanding the outcomes of strategic
actions (Boyd, Dess & Rasheed, 1993), archival measures
were used to assess the cause of decline.

The measure of

input-environmental causes of decline was the ratio of
salary per full-time employee (FTE) as compared to the
Columbia/HCA average.

If skilled employees are relatively

scarce, then the hospital would have to pay more to
attract them than the other hospitals in the system (Nutt
& Milter, 1992); thus, a ratio higher than the system's
average would indicate scarce employee resources in that
hospital's location.

To eliminate the impact of regional

wage differences, this ratio was adjusted by the regional
wage index.

This variable, as well as the other cause-of-

decline variables, was averaged over the years that the
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organizations met the selection criteria for sample
inclusion.
Table 4-4
Operationalization of Cause of Decline

VARIABLE

MEASURE

DATA
SOURCE

Input-Environmental
Cause of Decline

Salary per FTE (adjusted
by wage index) / Columbia HCA average

CHIPS

Internal Cause of
Decline

Length of stays (adjusted
for case mix) / ColumbiaHCA average

CHIPS

OutputEnvironmental
Cause of Decline

Market share of county /
prior year

CHIPS

Internal causes of decline were represented by the
length of stay compared to Columbia/HCA average.

Length

of stay is the number of days the average patient is
hospitalized and is a measure of efficiency (Goes & Meyer
1990).

The more efficient a hospital is in providing

medical care, the shorter the length of stay (Ketchen,
Thomas & Snow, 1993) .

Thus, the extent to which this

ratio exceeds Columbia/HCA average indicates the extent tc
which the hospital suffered from internal causes of
decline.

This measure was adjusted for case mix to

eliminate differences among hospitals regarding the
severity of illness treated.
The measure selected to represent output environmental causes of decline was change in county
market share.

The county is a widely-used measure of a
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hospital market area (Garnick, Luft, Robinson & Tetreault,
19 87)

The change was measured between the year prior to

and the year of sample inclusion.

A declining market

share may suggest the presence of a new competitor, the
addition of new services by a competitor.

Whatever the

specific underlying reason, a declining market share
fundamentally represents that the hospital1s services are
less desirable than those of competitors; thus, a
declining market share represents an output-environmental
cause of decline.
Turnaround performance.

The most complex construct

in this study is performance.

As noted in Chapter 2,

performance is a multidimensional construct that can be
conceptualized in terms of financial, operational, or
effectiveness outcomes

(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986) .

Because performance is a multidimensional construct, the
dimensions should exhibit divergent validity (i.e., the
three dimensions should be distinct) as well as convergent
construct validity (i.e., there should be correspondence
among the three dimensions) .

Thus, it is generally

believed that the multiple dimensions of performance
should be examined in the same study, so that divergence
and convergence can be examined (Cameron, 1986;
Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).
This study did indeed examine all three dimensions of
performance.

The effectiveness outcomes were obtained
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with the use of questionnaires.

The respondents were

asked to respond in a five-point Likert scale format to
two questions about the overall performance of the
hospital (See Appendix).

The responses to the two

questions were averaged to obtain a measure of the
effectiveness outcome for each hospital.

Operating

performance was measured with the hospital occupancy rate.
Occupancy reflects the extent to which a hospital presents
an attractive bundle of characteristics to admitting
physicians and potential patients (Ketchen, Thomas & Snow,
1993; Molinari, Morlock, Alexander & Lyles, 1993) and,
thus, serves as a measure of operating performance.
Financial performance was measured in this study with ROA,
which is a widely-used financial performance measure in
studies of hospitals

(e.g., Clement, D'Aunno & Poyzer,

1993; Cleverley & Harvey, 1992; Molinari, Morlock,
Alexander & Lyles,

1993).

As shown in Table 4-5, the operational and financial
performance indicators were measured in two ways.

First,

these indicators were averaged over a three-year period
that began one year after the year during which the
hospital qualified for inclusion in the sample.

Second,

these indicators were measured during the third year after
the year during which the hospital qualified for inclusion
in the sample.
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Organizational performance was measured in the first
way (i.e., 3-year average) because averaging prevents oneyear outliers from producing spurious results (Thomas,
Clark

Sc

Gioia, 1993) .

Measuring performance in the second

way (i.e., the third year only) gives an indication of the
long-term success of the organization's strategy.

It is

conceptually different from the first method because it is
not affected by large write-offs and losses that may
happen in the first year of the turnaround (cf. Robbins &
Pearce, 1992).

Thus, this measure attempts to parcel out

any retrenchment expenses by examining performance in only
the third year (Barker, 1992).
Table 4-5
Operationalization of Performance
DATA
SOURCE

VARIABLE

MEASURE

Effectiveness
Performance

Average of Likert-scale
responses

Survey

Operational
Performance

Three-year average occupancy
Occupancy in third year

CHIPS
CHIPS

Financial
Performance

Three-year average ROA
ROA in third year

CHIPS
CHIPS

The choice of three years was based on a summary of
past turnaround studies that indicated organizations take
three years on average to achieve turnaround (Hoffman,
1989).

Further, a relatively short period was necessary

to minimize potential history threats (i.e., performance
effects of events unrelated to the turnaround strategies -
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- Cook & Campbell, 1979).

Finally, a longer period likely

would have increased retrospective errors

(i.e.,

misreporting past events or behaviors -- Golden, 1992).
Thus, three years appeared to be a prudent time frame.
Data Collection Procedures
The measures of strategy process and effectiveness
performance were obtained via a mailed questionnaire.

The

content validity and reliability of these scale items were
established using a retranslation exercise (Russell &
Russell, 1992; Smith & Kendall, 1963).

In this exercise,

a panel of nine doctoral graduate students sorted
individual scale items into piles representing the
variables.

As a result of this exercise, one item was

removed from the questionnaire because it was not
consistently sorted into the "correct" pile.

The

remaining questions were sorted into the "correct" piles
(i.e., at least eight of the nine students sorted the
remaining questions into the "correct" pile).

Thus, the

construct validity and reliability of the scale items were
demonstrated.
The construction of the questionnaire and associated
materials (i.e., cover letters and envelopes) was guided
by Dillman's

(1978) total design method.

Dillman and

associates' specific and empirically-supported
recommendations were designed to maximize both the
validity of the survey questions and the response rate.
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Based on the effectiveness of the total design method (cf.
Snow & Thomas, 1994), Dillman's

(1978) methods guided

activities throughout the survey process.
Dillman's (1978) method specifies that questionnaires
be pilot tested with three types of individuals
(academics, practitioners in the industry of interest, and
industry experts).

Based on this suggestion, the

questionnaire for the present study was pilot tested with
four researchers, four hospital executives, and three
industry experts.
An initial mailing (including a personalized cover
letter, questionnaire, and stamped return envelope) was
followed in one week by a reminder postcard.

Two weeks

later, a second mailing was sent to those managers not
responding to the first.

Four weeks, later, a set of

questionnaires was sent via a facsimile machine.

A fourth

mailing, which included a personalized cover letter from a
Columbia/HCA hospital CEO, was sent out sixteen weeks
after the original mailing.

Copies of the cover letters

and questionnaire are included in the Appendix.
To establish the reliability and discriminant
validity of the variables measured by the survey, all
scale items were analyzed using confirmatory factor
analysis.

The results were examined to: 1) ensure that

the scale items were significantly related to their
specified constructs; 2) assess the reliability of the
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measures; and, 3) establish discriminant validity of the
variables.

Results of this confirmatory factor analysis

are presented in Chapter 5.
Another concern was the use of retrospective
accounts.

Individuals may attempt to project a socially-

desirable image by trying to present their past decisions
as rational (Feldman & March, 1981; Salancik & Meindl,
19 84).

Further, respondents may unintentionally represent

the past due to "hindsight" bias (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975)
or as an attempt to maintain their self-esteem (Huber &
Power, 19 85).

Notably, the recall by respondents in

organizations that have changed strategies is less
accurate than recall by respondents in organizations that
have not changed strategies.

Thus, retrospective errors

(i.e., misreporting the past -- Golden,

1992) are

especially pertinent threats to the validity of the survey
responses for this study.

Hence, attempts were made to

minimize these errors.
First, the survey was designed to ask about specific
facts or behaviors, rather than general assessments of the
hospitals' past strategies.

Accounts of past facts and

behaviors are likely to be more accurate than accounts of
past beliefs and intentions (Golden, 1992).

Further, the

cover letter attempted to motivate managers to provide
accurate information by stressing the value of this
research to their company and themselves.

Additionally,
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the survey included a customized financial summary of the
years 1988 - 1994.

Furnishing a financial summary with

the questionnaire helps focus the respondents' attention
to a specific time (Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

The items

included on the financial summary were validated by the
hospital executives who pretested the survey as those
items most likely to focus the respondent's attention on
the appropriate time frame.
Hypotheses Testing
As noted in Chapter 2, the theoretical basis of this
study is strategic choice (Child, 1972), which is a
descendant of contingency theory (Ginsberg & Venkatraman,
1985).

Contingency theory asserts that there is an

interaction between two or more variables that predicts a
third variable (Schoonhoven, 1981).

Thus, the statistical

tests for these hypotheses must be capable of detecting
interactions.

Specifically, hypotheses la, lb, lc and Id

predict an interaction between strategy content and
process variables, and hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c predict an
interaction between strategy content and cause of decline.
Because these hypotheses specify a particular criterion
(i.e., turnaround performance) and are precise in their
specification of the functional form (i.e., interaction
between strategy content and process, and interaction
between strategy content and cause of decline) , moderated
multiple regression analysis (MMR)is the appropriate

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

statistical test (Venkatraman, 1989) .

MMR is the most

powerful technique to detect the presence of a moderator
relationship (Stone, 1988).

Because turnaround

performance is measured using multiple variables,
multivariate moderated multiple regression (MMMR) is
appropriate (Johnson & Wichern, 1988) .
MMMR requires that a two-step process be followed.
In the first step, only the control variables and the main
effects are entered into the regression equation.

In the

second step, the interaction terms are added into the
equation.

If a statistically significant difference in

explanatory power is found (i.e., change in R‘), then an
interaction has been noted.
Summary
This chapter outlined the sample, data sources,
measures, and research design used in this study.

Chapter

5 presents the results of the analyses.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
This chapter is organized into three parts.

First,

the results of the primary data collection are described.
Second, descriptive statistics (means, standard
deviations, and Pearson zero-order correlations)
variables used in the study are presented.

for all

Finally, the

results of the analyses used to examine each hypothesis
developed in Chapter 4 are detailed.
Primary Data Collection
Responses were received from 77 or 58.8% of the 131
hospitals surveyed.

However, ten organizations responded

that no current managers had been at the hospital for a
sufficient amount of time to complete the questionnaire.
Further, one response was unusable because the top manager
failed to complete substantial portions of the survey.
Thus, the number of organizations represented by usable
responses was 66, or 50.4%, which compares very favorably
to the 12% response rate typically obtained when surveying
top managers (Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 1993).
Certain hospitals were represented by multiple responses;
thus, the total number of surveys received from the 66
hospitals was 80.

Because the goal of the confirmatory

factor analysis was to examine the reliability of and
variance extracted by the scale items, rather than analyze
the organization, all 80 surveys were used in the
confirmatory factor analysis.

However, the unit of
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analysis in the remaining analyses is the organization.
Thus, the questionnaire completed by the highest-level
manager was selected to represent the organization.

This

decision rule was deemed appropriate because higher-level
managers have the best understanding of an entire
organization (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980) , and, thus, would
have the most knowledge of an organization's strategy
processes and performance.

In the event that the

questionnaires were completed by managers at equal levels,
the questionnaire used was selected randomly.
Description of respondents.

Of the 66 usable

responses, 37 (56%) were completed by chief executive
officers, 19 (29%) were completed by chief operating
officers or chief financial officers, and 6 surveys (9%)
were completed by other managers (e.g., assistant
administrator, chief nursing officer).
surveys
them.

The remaining 4

(6%) did not identify which manager completed
To assess if there were any significant differences

in responses across these groups of respondents, the mean
responses were analyzed with multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA).

The results reflected no significant

differences in reported information usage (F=l.39, p<.25),
centralization (F=1.02, p<.39) and effectiveness
performance

(F=.05, p<.98).

Because there were no obvious

differences in responses, no further controls for
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differences in organizational level of the respondents
were deemed necessary.
The respondents, averaging 45 years of age, had been
at their hospital an average of 8.2 years and had an
average of 18 years of experience in the hospital
industry.

Operations /management was identified by 54.5%

of the respondents as their primary area of expertise.
Accounting/finance, clinical, and marketing were
identified by 16.7%, 4.5%, and 3.0% respectively.
Multiple areas were identified by 16.7%, and 4.6% did not
identify any areas of expertise.
Test for non-response bias.

The extent to which the

66 respondents represented the total sample of 131 was a
major concern.

Accordingly, T-tests were used for

comparison in terms of important hospital demographic
variables.

Also, because one might expect that successful

hospitals would be more likely to respond, respondents and
nonrespondents were compared based on subsequent
performance.

As shown in Table 5-1, the results of these

tests indicate that those hospitals which did respond do
not appear significantly different from those which did
not.

Thus, the hospitals from which responses were

received appear to be representative of all the hospitals
that were sent a questionnaire.
Reliability and variance extracted.
used to gather data on three variables

A survey was

(i.e.,
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Table 5-1
T-test Comparisons of Respondents and Non- Respondents

Dimension

Non-Respondents
(n=65)____

Respondents
(n=661

I. Size
Mean
Standard Deviation

158.7
84.1

164.5
113.5
t = .3324
(P < .74)

2. Outpatient revenue as a
percentage o f total revenue
Mean
Standard Deviation

23.79
7.53

24.91
11.93
t = .6451
(P < .52)

3. Medicare and Medicaid revenue
as a percentage o f total revenue
Mean
Standard Deviation

60.48
13.62

59.47
15.91
t = .39
(p < .70)

4. ROA in third year after sample
inclusion
Mean
Standard Deviation

3.05
12.39

-1.82
43.82
t = .87
(p < .39)

(table con'd.)
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Dimension

Respondents
(n=66)

Non-Respondents
fn=65)

5. ROA averaged over 3 years after
sample inclusion
Mean
Standard Deviation

-.51
11.25

-3.85
24.76
t = 1.0
(P < 32)

6 . Occupancy in third year

after sample inclusion
Mean
Standard Deviation

.63
.15

.63
.18
t = .05
(P < .9 6 )

7. Occupancy averaged over
three years after sample
inclusion
Mean
Standard Deviation

.62
.13

.63
.16
t = . 19
(p < .8 5 )
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centralization of decision making, information usage, and
performance).

The scale items representing the variables

were analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis.

The

results were examined to: l) ensure that the scale items
were significantly related to their specified constructs;
2) assess the reliability of the measures; and, 3) assess
discriminant validity among the variables.
The correlations among the scale items for
centralization of decision making and performance, and the
average of the information usage items were analyzed with
confirmatory factor analysis.

Because there was a sole

indicator for information usage, reliability estimates
were used to fix measurement parameters (cf. Williams &
Hazer, 1986).

Specifically, the information usage

construct's path to its indicator was set equal to the
square root of the indicator's composite latent
reliability, which was computed with the sums of
standardized loadings and indicator measurement errors
derived from the confirmatory factor analysis ran with all
fifteen items (Q3 items 1-15) loading on one construct.
The reliability of the fifteen items was .825; thus the
path was set equal to .908.
error

The indicator's measurement

was set to one minus the reliability (.175).

A Heywood case was noted when examining the
measurement model results.

Q 8 .1 had a loading of 1.05;

thus, before the overall fit of the model could be
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assessed, the measurement error for q8.1 was set to a
small value (.005) to correct the offending estimate
(Hair, et al., 1992).
data was satisfactory.
nonsignificant

The overall fit of the model to the
The

x' was 10.85 and

(p=.62, 13 df); however, this measure of

fit may not be reliable with sample sizes smaller than 100
(Hair, et a l . 1992) .
examined.

Thus, other measures of fit were

These alternative measures indicated support

for an adequate overall fit of the model.

Bentler's

(1990) comparative fit index was 1.0, Bollen's (1989)
incremental fit index was 1.0, Jorskog and Sorbom's
goodness of fit index was .96, Tucker and Lewis'

(1993)

(1973)

fit index was 1.0, and the normed fit index (Bentler &
Bonett, 1990) was .94.

The model fit was further

evaluated by testing whether any of the three hypothesized
factors could be combined without significantly affecting
the fit of the model.

The results suggested that the

three factor model fit the data significantly better than
any rival model.
As shown in the Table 5-2, the reliability of and
amount of variance extracted by the items for each
construct were satisfactory.

Although the reliability of

the performance construct may be slightly inflated because
the respecification of the measurement error for q8 .1
(Hair et al., 1992), the reliability of the items
comprising centralization of decision making and

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

performance far exceeded the recommended level of .70
(Nunnally, 1978), measuring .84 and .82 respectively.

The

variance extracted for these same measures exceeds the
recommended .50 level (Hair et al., 1992).

The variance

extracted totaled .57 for centralization of decision
making and .59 for performance.

The correlation between

factors was significant only between centralization of
decision making and information usage (r=.431, t=3.76,
p<.001).

The correlations between performance and

centralization of decision making, and performance and
information usage were nonsignificant (r=.179, t=1.496;
and r=-.01 t=-.10 respectively).
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5-3 presents the means, standard deviations,
and Pearson zero-order correlations among the control,
strategy content and process, cause of decline, and
performance variables.
Testing of Hypotheses
Tables 5-4 through 5-9 summarize the regression
results.

As noted in Chapter 4, two measures of

turnaround strategy (weighted change in strategy offerings
and change in routine days percentage) were obtained.

The

goal of obtaining two measures of strategy was to ensure
the findings were robust across measures of strategy
(Jick, 1979).

Thus, the hypotheses were tested using the
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Table 5-2
Completely Standardized Confirmatory Factor Loadings

Item #
2.2

2.3
2.5
2.6

average
of 3.13.15

8.1
8.2

Item
did all members of the hospital's top management
make strategic decisions on a regular basis?
was authority for making strategic decisions shared
by all top managers?
did all top managers share responsibility for strategic decisions?
could decision making authority be characterized as shared among all
top managers?

Centralization

Performance

.737
.764
.787
.728

information usage

.908

the effectiveness o f your hospitals response to the financial decline
the current performance o f your hospital

Variance Extracted
Reliability

Info Usage

.997

.648

.57
.84

.59

.82

measures of strategy consecutively.

Tables 5-4 through 5-

6 show the regression results when using the weighted
change in service offerings as the measure of strategy.
Tables 5-7 through 5-9 show the regression results when
using the change in routine days percentage as the measure
of strategy.

Comparing Equations l and 2 for all

performance measures allows examination of the hypotheses.
Equation 1 includes the control variables and the main
effects of the strategy process and content, and cause of
decline variables.

Equation 2 includes these same

variables and the interactions among these variables.
all cases,

In

the change in R~ after adding the interaction

effects was nonsignificant.

Thus, there was no support

for the presence of interactions (Jaccard, Turrisi & Wan,
199 0), and no support for the hypotheses developed in this
study.
Multicollinearity is often found among variables when
multiplicative terms are used to represent interaction
effects

(Jaccard, Turrisi & Wan, 1990).

If present,

multicollinearity can distort the results or make the
results unstable (Hair et a l ., 1992).

Thus, the impact of

multicollinearity was assessed using a procedure outlined
in Hair et al

(1992).

First, all condition indices

(ameasure of the relative amount of variance associated
with an eigenvalue, such that larger values indicate high
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Table 5-3
Descriptive Statistics (IXS66)1

Variables
Control Variables
1. Size
2 . Outpatient Service Mix
3. Medicare and
Medicaid Intensity
4. Prior Performance

Mean

S.D.

I

158.73
23.79

84.09
7.53

-.49

60.48
1.52

13.62

-.40

8.22

-.10

24.58
-1.30

19.13
2.69

-»
.J J
-.05

-.10

.04

-.06
.07

3.25

.52

.10

-.13

-.11

3.53

.81

.15

.06

-.18

1.03

.11

-.12

-.02

-.09

1.04

.18

.04

-.02

.22

.99

.11

.01

.20

-.10

4.15

.77

-.12

.10

.04

44.23

10.96

.27

-.24

-.06

44.99

10.74

.

JyJ-y

-.35

-.14

-.51
3.06

11.25
12.4

-.08
.09

.23
.27

-.04
-.11

2

3

.19
.19

.13

Strategy Content
5. Weighted Change
in Service Offerings
6 . Change in Routine Days

Strategy Process
7. Information Usage
8 . Centralization o f
Decision Making

Cause of Decline
9. Input - Environmental
Cause o f Decline
10 . Internal Cause of
Decline
11. Output - Environmental
Cause o f Decline

Performance
12 . Effectiveness Performance

13. Three-year Average
Occupancy
14. Occupancy in
Third Year
15. Three-year
Average ROA
16. ROA in third vear

'Correlations greater than | .2 4 1 are significant as p< 05; correlations greater than | .
are significant at p< 01; correlations greater than J.391 are significant at p < 0 0 1 .

(table con'

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

82

Variables

4

5

6

7

8

Control Variables
1. Size
2. Outpatient Service Mix
3. Medicare and
Medicaid Intensity
4. Prior Performance

Strategy Content
5. Weighted Change
in Service Offerings
6 . Change in Routine Days

-.09
-.35

.20

-.06

-.14

.02

.23

.19

.02

.27

-.04

-.16

.13

.09

.18

-.23

-.04

.12

.17

-.20

-.04

.17

.02

-.11

-.02

.03

.12

.11

-.03

.16

-.26

.26

.24

.17

.09

-.18

.23

.12

.23

.08

.02

.10

-.07

.14

.08
.07

-.18
. 22

-.02

Strategy Process
7. Information Usage
8 . Centralization o f

Decision Making

Cause of Decline
9. Input - Environmental
Cause o f Decline
10. Internal Cause o f
Decline
11. Output - Environmental
Cause o f Decline

Performance
12. Effectiveness Performance
13. Three-year Average
Occupancy
14. Occupancy in
Third Year
15. Three-year
Average ROA
16. ROA in third year

.04

'Correlations greater than | .241 are significant as p<05; correlations greater than
are significant at p<.01; correlations greater than j.391 are significant at p< 001.

(table con'd.)
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Variables

9

10

11

12

13

Control Variables
1. Size
2. Outpatient Service Mix
3. Medicare and
Medicaid Intensity
4. Prior Performance

Strategy Content
5. Weighted Change
in Service Offerings
6 . Change in Routine Days

Strategy Process
7. Information Usage
8 . Centralization of
Decision Making

Cause of Decline
9. Input - Environmental
Cause o f Decline
10. Internal Cause o f
Decline
11. Output - Environmental
Cause o f Decline

-.18
-.01

.04

.11

-.03

.34

-.17

-.10

-.09

.01

-.17

-.03

-.07

-.03

.91

.16
-.14

.12

.09

.10

.13

.00

.25

1

12. Effectiveness Performance
13. Three-year Average
Occupancy
14. Occupancy in
Third Year
15. Three-year
Average ROA
16. ROA in third year

UJ
O

Performance

-.21

'Correlations greater than | .2 4 1 are significant as p < 0 5 ; correlations greater than
are significant at p< 01; correlations greater than | .39 [ are significant at p< 001.

(table con
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Variables

14

15

-.01
.18

.75

16

Control Variables
1. Size
2. Outpatient Service Mix
3. Medicare and
Medicaid Intensity
4. Prior Performance

Strategy Content
5. Weighted Change
in Service Offerings
6 . Change in Routine Days

Strategy Process
7. Information Usage
8 . Centralization o f
Decision Making

Cause of Decline
9. Input - Environmental
Cause o f Decline
10. Internal Cause o f
Decline
11. Output - Environmental
Cause o f Decline

Performance
12. Effectiveness Performance
13. Three-year Average
Occupancy
14. Occupancy in
Third Year
15. Three-year
Average ROA
16. ROA in third year

'Correlations greater than | .24 j are significant as p<05; correlations greater than | .
are significant at p< 01: correlations greater than | .391 are significant at p<001.
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Table 5-4
Regression Results
Change In Service Offerings as Indicator
of Strategy Content

Independent Variables

Equation

Dependent Variables
Three Year
Average ROA
I
2

ROA in
Third Year
1
2

Size
Outpatient Service Mix
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity
Prior Performance

.11
-.09

Change in Service Offerings

.03

.08

.04

3.09

-.10

-.13
-.06

.11
.04

-.12
-.26
.02

-.15
-.14
.15

.36*
.40**
.15
-.13

Information Usage
Centralization

i
o
-j

.36*
jg**

.15
-.01

Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Internal Cause o f Decline
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline

.19
-.32*
.04

.05
-.38
-.01

.27
.26
.42** .41**
.03
.02
-.18
-.22

Change in Service Offerings X
Info Usage

-1.05

-1.16

Change in Service Offerings X
Centralization

-.49

-.38

Change in Service Offerings X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline

.88

-.23

Change in Service Offerings X
Internal Cause o f Decline

.21

-.73

Change in Service Offerings X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline

.37

-.67

Note: *p< 05; **p<0l; ***p< 001
(table con'd.)
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Dependent Variables
Three Year
Average ROA

uation
df
Adjusted R 2
R2
F
Change in R 2
F
Note:

1
(10,55)
.13
.26
1.99*

2
(15,50)
.10

.31
1.47
.05
.73

ROA in
Third Year

1
(10,55)
.13
.27
1.93

*p< 05; **p<01; ***p<.001
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2
(15,50)
.10

.31
1.50
.04
.58
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Table 5-5
Regression Results
Change in Service Offerings as Indicator
of Strategy Content

Independent Variables

Equation

Dependent Variables
Three Year
Average Occupancy
I
2

Occupancy in
Third Year
1
2

Size
Outpatient Service Mix
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity
Prior Performance

.22
-.10

.11

.21

-.10

-.23

.13
-.30*

.15
-.37*

-.15

-.21
.04
-.23

Change in Service Offerings

.16

-.94

.16

-2.52

Information Usage
Centralization

.19
.08

.28
-.23

.23
.03

.30
-.37

-.21

-.37
-.26
-.04

-.19
-.14
-.03

-.39
-23
-.08

Input-Environmental Cause of Decline
Internal Cause o f Decline
Output-Environmental Cause of Decline

.14

-.25
-.07

.02

Change in Service Offerings X
Info Usage

-.07

.12

Change in Service Offerings X
Centralization

1.07

1.35

.54

.91

-.17

.21

-.21

.22

Change in Service Offerings X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Change in Service Offerings X
Internal Cause o f Decline
Change in Service Offerings X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Note:

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
(ta b le

c o n 1' d . )
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Dependent Variables
Three Year
Average Occupancy

Equation
df
Adjusted R2
R2
F
Change in R2
F

I

1
(10,55)
.15
.28
2.16*

Occupancy in
Third Y ear

(15,50)
.13
■*»

1.65
.05
1.19

(10.55)
.14
.27
2 .0 2 *

(15,50)
.14
.34
1.70
07
1.04

Note: *p<.05; **p<01; ***p<.001
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Table 5-6
Regression Results
Change in Service Offerings as Indicator
of Strategy Content

Independent Variables

Equation

Dependent Variable
Performance
_1

2

Size
Outpatient Service Mix
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity
Prior Performance

-.20

-.14

-.08
.05

-.10

.00

.03
.12

Change in Service Offerings

.10

3.91

-.01
.20

-.05
.19

.08
.01
.35**

.03
.24

Information Usage
Centralization
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Internal Cause o f Decline
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline

9 5 **

Change in Service Offerings X
Info Usage

.15

Change in Service Offerings X
Centralization

.10

Change in Service Offerings X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline

. 12

Change in Service Offerings X
Internal Cause o f Decline
Change in Service Offerings X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Note:

-.69

-3 .68

*p<05; **p<01; ***p<001

(table con'd.)
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Dependent Variable
Performance
Equation
df
Adjusted R 2
R2
F
Change in R 2
F

_l
(10,55)
.04
.19
1.27

2
(15.50)
.05
.27
1.23
.08
1.12

Note: *p<05; **p<.0l; ***p<.001
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Table 5-7
Regression Results
Change in Routine Days as Indicator o£ Strategy Content

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Three Year
Average ROA
I

Size
Outpatient Service Mix
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity
Prior Performance

.07

Change in Routine Days

.07

Information Usage
Centralization

.10

.07

Input-Environmental Cause of Decline
Internal Cause o f Decline
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline

.18
.33*
.04

.37*
.38**
.10

2

1

.36*
.37*
.08
-.07

.28
.41**
-.03
-.16

2
.21

.36**
-.05
-.21

-2.76

.07

-.80

i i
o o

Equation

ROA in
Third Year

-.06

.03
-.09

.22

-.43*
.13

-.12

-.14
. 27*
.02

-.11

-.58**
.16

Change in Routine Days X
Info Usage

.39

1.34

Change in Routine Days X
Centralization

.11

-.64

Change in Routine Days X
Input-Environmental Cause of Decline

1.38

.39

Change in Routine Days X
Internal Cause o f Decline

-.50

-2 . 11 *

Change in Routine Days X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline

1.46

1.85

Note:

*p<05; * * p < 01 ; ***p<001

(table con'd.)
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Dependent Variables
Three Year
Average ROA

Equation
df
Adjusted R 2
R2
F
Change in R 2
F

Note:

1
(10,55)
.14
.27
2.03*

ROA in
Third Year
1

(15,55)
.10

.31
1.50
.04
.60

(10,55)
.13
.26
1.95

(15,55)
.18
.37
1.98*
.06
1.75

*p<05; **p< 0 l; ***p<001

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

Table 5-8
Regression Results
Change in Routine Days as Indicator of Strategy Content

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Three Year
Average Occupancy

Equation
Size
Outpatient Service Mix
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity
Prior Performance

1

.19
-.12
.12

-.25

2

.14
-.16

Occupancy in
Third Year
1

2

-.36*

.17
-.24
.03
-.11

.07
-.27
-.01
-.24

.10

Change in Routine Days

.22

1.52

.13

-.08

Information Usage
Centralization

.17
.09

.17
.13

.21

.05

.28
.06

-.26*
-.27*
-.04

-.32*
-.34
.03

-.23
-.16

-.30*
-.29

-.01

.12

Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Internal Cause o f Decline
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Change in Routine Days X
Info Usage

.17

1.29

Change in Routine Days X
Centralization

.13

-.28

-2.44

-2.50

Change in Routine Days X
Internal Cause o f Decline

-.59

-.90

Change in Routine Days X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline

1.11

2.55*

Change in Routine Days X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline

Note:

*p< 05: **p< 01; ***p< 001

(table con'd.)
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Dependent Variables

Three Year
Average Occupancy
Equation
df
Adjusted R 2
R2
F
Change in R 2
F

Note:

1
(10,55)
.18
.30
2.38*

2

Occupancy in
Third Year
1

(15,50)
.19
.37
2.01*
.07
1.18

(10,55)
.13
.26
1.97

2
(15,50)
.19
.37
1.98*
.11

1.75

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 5-9
Regression Results
Change in Routine Days as Indicator of Strategy Content

Dependent Variable
Performance
Equation

1

_2

-.16
-.09
.05
.02

-.18
-.08
.00
-1.04

.09

- 1.00

Information Usage
Centralization

-.03
.19

-.02
.23

Input-Environmental Cause of Decline
Internal Cause o f Decline
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline

.05

.02

-.01

.07
.39**

Size
Outpatient Service Mix
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity
Prior Performance
Change in Routine Days

.37**

Change in Routine Days X
Info Usage

.98

Change in Routine Days X
Centralization

.27

Change in Routine Days X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline

-1.50

Change in Routine Days X
Internal Cause o f Decline

.52

Change in Routine Days X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline

.82

Note: *p< 05;**p<0l;***p<001

(table con'd.)
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Dependent Variable
Performance

Equation
df
Adjusted R2
R2
F
Change in R2
F

I

_2

(10,55)
.04
.19
1.26

(15,50)
-.02
.22

.93
.03
.39

Note: *p< 05;**p<01;***p< 001
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collinearity -- Hair et al., 1992) greater than 15 were
identified.

Then for all the condition indices greater

than 15, variables with variance proportions greater than
50 percent were identified.

This analysis did not

identify any condition indices where a substantial
proportion of the variance was explained for multiple
coefficients.

Thus, multicollinearity does not appear to

have had a significant impact on these results,
further ensure that the impact of multicollinearity was
minimal, the variables comprising the main effects

(e.g.,

strategy process and content, and cause of decline) were
centered prior to the formation of the multiplicative
interaction terms

(Cronbach, 1987) .

The results of the

regression analyses with the centered variables were not
materially different from the results of the regressionTo
analyses presented above.

Thus, the impact of

multicollinearity appears minimal.
Summary
This chapter presented the results of the primary
data collection, the means, standard deviations, and
Pearson zero-order correlations among the variables, and
the results of the regression analyses.

The measures

gathered by primary data collection (i.e., information
usage, centralization of decision making, and the
effectiveness measure of performance) were shown to be
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reliable and valid.

Nonetheless, the results of the

regression analyses failed to support any of the
hypotheses.

In the next chapter, the results presented

above are discussed.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter reviews the study's results and
discusses avenues for future research prompted by the
results.

First, the results of the hypotheses testing are

discussed.
identified.

Second, the limitations of this study are
Finally,

several research opportunities are

described.
Discussion of Results
This study posited that achieving two types of fit
positively impacts turnaround performance.

The first type

of fit is between strategy content and strategy process,
and the second type of fit is between strategy and cause
of decline.

However,

the results of the study did not

show that either type of fit impacted performance.
Although the notion that strategy content or strategy
process individually impact turnaround performance was not
formally hypothesized, past research has supported the
relationship between strategy content and performance
(e.g., Dess & Davis, 1984; Hrebiniak, Joyce Sc Snow,
Rumelt,

1982) and strategy process and performance

Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Huff & Reger,
& Kotulic, 1985) .

1989;
(e.g.,

1987; Priem, Rasheed

Nonetheless, the results of the study

do not show a relationship between either strategy content
or strategy process and turnaround performance.

The

following potential explanations for these results are
discussed below: l) strategy is not crucial to an
99
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organization's ability to restore its performance; 2) the
two types of fit are necessary, but not sufficient
conditions for enhanced performance; 3) turnaround
processes are too idiosyncratic to generalize; and, 4)
alternative conceptualizations and statistical tests of
fit may be more appropriate.
The first possibility is that the choice of strategy
is not crucial because strategy may be only loosely
coupled to performance.

Loose coupling can result from

the equifinality of strategies or causal independence
(Weick, 1976).

More specifically, the choice of strategy

may not be important because both turnaround strategies
are equally effective in resuscitating an organization's
performance (i.e., equifinality may be operative -Gresov, 1989; Mohr, 1982) . Previous research has found
that more than one strategy may lead to high performance
in a given situation; for example, different strategies
may perform equally well if used in different industries
(Hambrick, 1983), or if supported by appropriate
distinctive competencies

(Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980).

This study originally predicted the equifinality of
turnaround strategies; both strategies were predicted to
lead to high performance if matched to the appropriate
cause of decline.

Although the predicted equifinality

resulting from matching strategy to the cause of decline
was not supported, equifinality may still be operative.
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For example, variances in distinctive competencies

(i.e.,

those things an organization does well in comparison to
its competitors -- Selznick, 1957) might contribute to
equifinality.

Defender strategies (Miles & Snow, 1978)

are successful when supported by competencies in financial
management, production, and applied engineering, and
prospector strategies (Miles & Snow, 1978) are successful
when supported by competencies in product research and
development, market research, and basic engineering
and Hrebiniak, 1980) .

(Snow

The defender and efficiency

turnaround strategies both strongly emphasize efficiency
(Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Miles & Snow, 1978).

Thus, the

efficiency strategy may be successful if supported by some
of the same competencies that support the defender
strategy (e.g., financial management, service delivery,
and engineering geared toward improving efficiency in
service delivery).

The prospector and entrepreneurial

turnaround strategies both strongly emphasize product and
market effectiveness (Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Miles &
Snow, 19 78).

Hence, the entrepreneurial strategy may be

successful if supported by the same competencies that
support a prospector strategy (e.g., market research and
new service development).

Future research is needed to

assess the role of supporting competencies in turnaround
strategy equifinality.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

The other reason for the loose coupling between
strategy and turnaround performance may be causal
independence.

Specifically, the strategic decisions of

managers may not be related to performance; instead, the
coercive forces of the environment may determine which
organizations will turnaround and which organizations will
fail (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984) .

Population

ecologists posit that individual organizations rarely
succeed in making changes to their strategies (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984).

Because of this inertia, the sources of

the organization's decline will continue to exhibit
downward pressure on performance.

This study showed very

modest support for this ecological line of thinking.

Some

of the cause of decline variables reflected a negative
relationship with turnaround performance; in contrast,
neither strategy content nor performance was significantly
related to turnaround performance.

Length of stay, an

indicator of inefficiency, was negatively related to
financial performance (see Tables 5-4 and 5-7) and
occupancy (see Table 5-8).

Further, salary per FTE, an

indicator of input -environmental causes of decline, was
negatively related to occupancy (See Table 5-8).

These

results lend support to the notion that the hospitals were
not malleable, and their attempts to change were not
realized.

As a result, the environment determined the

subsequent performance of the organizations.

However,
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this study's conclusions regarding the impact of
environmental determinism must be viewed with extreme
caution.

The findings were not robust across all measures

of performance (i.e., financial,

operating, and

effectiveness) and were not consistent across all the
causes of decline.

Notably, the relationship between

salary per FTE (the indicator of input -environmental
causes of decline) and subsequent performance was found
only for occupancy.

Further, no relationship between

market share (the indicator of output-environmental causes
of decline) and performance was found.
In examining turnaround, future research could
integrate ecological theories (Hannan & Freeman, 1977)
with strategic choice theories (Child, 1972) to better
explain an organization's ability to restore its
performance.

Turnaround studies have not accounted for

population effects into their design (McKelvey, 1988).
Investigating organizational phenomena at multiple levels
of analysis could enhance understanding of the phenomena
(Rousseau, 1985) .

Thus, our understanding of

organizational decline and turnaround could be enhanced by
undertaking a multi-level investigation.

For example,

population/industry environments vary in their coercive
forces and organizations vary in their adaptability due to
differences in the impediments to adaptation (McKelvey,
1988).

Hence,

it seems that the tightness of the coupling
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between strategy and turnaround performance would be
influenced by the interaction between the strength of the
coercive forces in the environment and the barriers to
adaption within organizations.

The choice of strategy

would be important for adaptable organizations in
environments with weak coercive forces.

In contrast, the

choice of strategy may be unimportant for unadaptable
organizations in environments with strongly coercive
forces; these organizations likely would be selected out.
A second alternative explanation to the lack of
support for the hypotheses is that the interactions
between strategy content and strategy process, and
strategy content and cause of decline are necessary but
not sufficient conditions for performance.

When managers

match their strategy process to strategy content and their
strategy content with the cause of decline,

it may become

possible to enhance organizational performance.

However,

the realized performance may depend on additional
contingency variables that were not examined in this
study.

For example, the efficacy of strategies depends on

the availability of resources to support that strategy
(Wernerfelt, 1984).
contingency variable.

Thus, resources may be an important
This study's results provide modest

support for the importance of an organization's resources.
Two hospital

characteristics, both of which could

indicate a hospital's resources, impacted subsequent
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performance; hospital size (a possible indicator of
resources) and outpatient service mix (an indicator of
capabilities) during decline impacted subsequent
performance (see Tables 5-4 and 5-7).
One resource-related issue that has received some
attention in the turnaround research stream is
retrenchment (i.e., the liquidation and divestment of
assets to improve the organization's cash position -Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

Recent research has indicated

that the generation of positive cash balances through
retrenchment is a key to restoring an organization's
performance to satisfactory levels (Pearce & Robbins,
1994; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

Indeed, Pearce and Robbins

(1994) maintain that retrenchment is the foundation for
all turnarounds.

However, other recent research (Barker &

Mone, 1994) has disagreed on the utility of retrenchment
in all situations, and suggested that the utility of
retrenchment may be dependent upon the cause of a firm's
decline.
An alternative determinant of the utility of
retrenchment may be disparity between a declining firm's
resource portfolio and the resources necessary to support
a given turnaround strategy.

In general, an

organization's resources suggest an optimal strategy
(Wernerfelt, 1984).

However, an organization is not

completely constrained by their present resources; some of
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the resources used to support an organization's strategy
may be purchased (Barney, 1986).

Thus, retrenchment may

be useful when an organization lacks the specific
resources relevant to a new strategy and the cash
generated from retrenchment is used to procure the
relevant resources.

In situations where the organization

has the relevant resources, retrenchment may serve no
useful purpose.
Third, the lack of significant results may suggest
that turnaround processes are highly idiosyncratic to each
hospital and, thus, not generalizable.

For example, the

respondent at Daytona Medical Center indicated that
his/her hospital's decline was attributable to a boycott
of the hospital by admitting physicians.

Part of this

hospital's turnaround strategy involved mending
relationships with area physicians, which is a political
strategy instead of the competitive strategies examined in
this study.

Political strategies include a focus on

collective strategies

(i.e., strategies of cooperation

instead of competition -- Astley, 1984).

Although past

turnaround research has focused on competitive strategies
(e.g., Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Robbins &
Pearce, 1992; Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976), the future
of this research stream may lie in the examination of
collective strategies.

Organizations do not act as closed

systems (Katz & Kahn, 1966); thus, understanding a
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declining organization's interactions with its environment
may yield important insights into an organization's
ability to restore its performance.

By identifying the

stakeholders of an organization (Freeman, 1984), future
research could identify the important constituencies of
declining firms (e.g., suppliers of financial capital -D'Aveni,

1989; customers and employees -- Hardy, 1987;

regulators -- Birnbaum, 1985).

Once identified, the

impact of strategies geared toward garnering the support
of these external constituencies could be assessed.
A final possible explanation of the results is that
the concept of fit was theorized and modeled incorrectly.
There are differing theoretical conceptions and
statistical tests of fit commonly used in strategy
research (Venkatraman, 1989).

This study's theoretical

basis is strategic choice (Child, 1972) ; accordingly,

fit

was theorized to be a bivariate interaction between
variables.

The bivariate relationships were assumed to

be linear; however, the relationships may be curvilinear.
To assess the possibility that the relationships between
performance and strategy content and process variables
were curvilinear rather than linear, the strategy content
and process variables were squared and used in regression
equations

(Hair et al., 1992).

The regression equations

were nonsignificant across the performance measures.
Thus, the post-hoc analyses showed no support for the
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notion that the relationships between strategy content and
performance, and strategy process and performance are
curvilinear.
Bivariate relationships often are under specified
(Miller, 1981).

Hence, the relationship among strategy

content and process, and performance may be viewed best in
multivariate terms.

For example, the configurational

perspective of fit groups organizations simultaneously
along several important organizational dimensions
& Mintzberg,

19 84).

(Miller

Because configurations are comprised

of firms with similar combinations of important
organizational variables, sets of inter-relationships can
be holistically linked to performance (Ketchen, Thomas Sc
Snow, 1993).

Therefore, holistic combinations of strategy

content and strategy process factors may impact subsequent
performance.
Post-hoc analysis did not support this alternative
theoretical perspective.

Following procedures outlined in

Ketchen and Shook (199 6), the hospitals in this sample
were clustered using the weighted change in services,
information usage, and centralization as clustering
variables.

The stability of the clustering solution

across clustering algorithms was poor.

Further, the

resultant clusters were uninterpretable and reflected no
significant differences in performance.
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This section has identified four possible
explanations for the results of this study.

In addition,

future research avenues related to the results were
highlighted.

First, strategy may not crucial to an

organization's ability to restore its performance;
accordingly, future research could explore the interaction
of strategy and distinctive competencies in creating
equifinality.

Also, ecological theories and strategic

choice theories could be integrated and tested.

Second,

the two types of fit are necessary, but not sufficient
conditions for enhanced performance.

Future research

could explore the role of resources as an important
contingency variable.

Third, turnaround processes are too

idiosyncratic to generalize.

The roles of external

constituencies and collective strategies in organizational
turnaround were identified as worthy of future research.
Finally, alternative conceptualizations and statistical
tests of fit may be more appropriate.

In the next

section, the limitations of this study are addressed.
Limitations
As with all studies (Thorngate, 1976), this
dissertation had limitations that must be noted.

These

include: 1) the number of respondents per organization; 2)
limited statistical power; 3) potential retrospective
bias; 4) limited generalizability of results; 5) potential
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survival bias; and, 6) omission of possible feedback
loops.

These limitations are discussed next.

Originally, this study's design included two
respondents per organization.

However, the turnover of

top managers at the hospitals was much greater than
expected.

As this study progressed, it became apparent

that obtaining multiple respondents from a sufficient
number of organizations was not going to be possible.
Indeed, only twelve organizations, were, in the end,
represented by multiple respondents.

Thus, the decision

was made to proceed with one survey per organization.
Although the use of one respondent per organization
is not unusual in strategy research (Venkatraman & Grant,
1986) , the validity of this study may have been enhanced
by multiple respondents per hospital.

Indeed, it has been

argued that some true substantive relationships have been
rejected because of measurement problems
Grant, 1986).

(Venkatraman &

Thus, there may have been a greater

probability of finding support for the hypotheses if
multiple respondents had been available.
The small sample size (N=66) limited statistical
power in this study.

When testing the hypotheses, the

maximum power obtained was .19 at the .05 level of
significance (Cohen, 1977).

Thus, the results should be

viewed as conservative tests of these hypotheses.

When

this study was proposed, it was anticipated that the
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sample size would approximate 110; thus, this study would
have an 80 percent probability of detecting a medium
effect

(change in R' = .15) at the .05 level of

significance.

Two factors account for the smaller-than-

expected sample size: l) the turnover of top-level
managers; and 2) the anticipated level of organizational
support from Columbia/HCA did not materialize.

It is

reasonable to assume the high level of turnover had a
dampening effect on the number of responses received.

The

second factor that reduced the anticipated sample size was
the level of organizational support.

Originally, an

executive at Columbia/HCA had agreed to: 1) send out
letters encouraging managers to respond to the survey;
and, 2) follow up with non-respondents by telephone.
Although, the executive did send out the letters, the
personal follow-up did not materialize.
Another limitation is the possible presence of
retrospective errors (i.e., misreporting the past -Golden,

1992).

Ideally, the variables measured by survey

would be measured with objective data, and the presence of
retrospective errors assessed.

However, this was not

possible because valid alternative methods of measuring
the strategy process variables and the effectiveness
performance variable were not available.

However, as

discussed in Chapter 4, efforts were made to reduce
retrospective errors.

These efforts included: 1)
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designing the survey to ask about specific facts or
behaviors; 2) attempting to motivate managers to provide
accurate information; and, 3) including a financial
summary to focus the thoughts of the respondents on the
appropriate period.

Nonetheless, it is possible that

managers may have misreported their organization's
information usage, centralization, and effectiveness
performance.

Future turnaround research should consider

collecting data by means that do not involve retrospective
data collection.

For example, if a sample could be

identified early in the stages of decline, data could be
collected at intervals of time such as the onset, points
during the decline and response, and when turnaround is
achieved.

However, such a research design would take a

major commitment of resources.
This study restricted the sample to a single industry
to ensure that industry-level effects on firm-level
performance were not confused with the performance effects
of interest

(Dess, Ireland & Hitt, 1990).

However, the

control over industry-level effects came at the cost of
generalizability across industries.

It is possible that

these hypotheses would have been supported in other
settings.

For example, the hypotheses may have been

supported in an industry where the influence of its
external constituents is significantly less.

Industries

vary regarding the influence of external constituents
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(Hirsch, 1975), and highly regulated industries are
subject to great influence by external constituencies
(Bimbaum, 1985) .

The hospital industry is highly

regulated and largely influenced by third-party payers
(Schulz & Johnson, 1983); thus, political strategies may
be more important than competitive strategies in the
hospital industry.

In other industries, where the

external constituencies are less influential (e.g.,
traditional manufacturing industries), competitive
strategies may have more influence on performance;
accordingly, the hypotheses may have been supported in
alternative settings.
Additionally, the strategy content/cause of decline
fit hypotheses may have been supported in industries
outside the service sector of the economy.

Although the

causes of decline were categorized differently, support
for matching strategy content to the cause of decline was
found in the textile manufacturing industry (Robbins &
Pearce, 1992).

Support for the hypotheses predicting

positive performance implications of achieving strategy
content/cause of decline fit may have been supported in
the manufacturing sector, because organizations in this
sector may have clearer organizational boundaries.

For

example, in the manufacturing sector, the customers
interface with the organization as part of the output
environment.

In contrast, the boundaries of the
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organization are less distinct in the service industry.
In the hospital industry, patients interface with the
organization as a customer in the output environment, and
can be considered a raw material

(i.e., an input) upon

admission and a "finished" product (i.e., and output) upon
discharge (Schulz & Johnson, 1983).

Thus, future research

on the role of strategy content/cause of decline fit
should be pursued in other research settings.
All firms in the sample were still operational at the
end of the focal period.

Thus, some hospitals may have

attained a fit between strategy process and content, or a
fit between strategy and cause of decline but still failed
(e.g., were closed, or merged with another hospital).
Thus, had it been possible, including these failed firms
may have influenced the results of this study.

Additional

research is needed to assess the extent of survival bias
in turnaround literature.

One design that could

accomplish this task is a longitudinal design where data
is collected at intervals.

By collecting data in

intervals, data could be collected from firms before they
fail and the opportunity to collect data from them is
missed.
Finally,

the model tested in this study ignores the

possibility of feedback loops; however, potentially
confounding feedback loops may exist.

Strategy process

and content have important implications for performance
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(Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Huff & Reger, 1987; Li, 1995;
Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991) ; nonetheless, performance also
has important implications for subsequent strategy content
and process

(Milliken & Lant, 1991).

This study tested

the strategy content and process to performance linkage,
but did not assess the impact of past performance on
current strategy process and content.

Current strategy

process and content may have been constrained by past
performance (Cameron, Whetten & Kim, 1987; Staw,
Sandelands & Dutton, 1981); thus, past performance may
have discouraged high levels of information usage,
decentralized decision making, or the use of efficiency or
entrepreneurial strategies.

The potential feedback loops

demonstrate that performance and strategy process and
content are temporally intertwined.

Thus,

future research

should involve longitudinal designs that would allow for
the detangling of these relationships.
Future Research
At appropriate spots throughout the discussion of the
results and limitations of this study, implications for
future research have been noted.

Nonetheless, there are

other future research opportunities.

These opportunities

are discussed in terms of organizational resources,
strategy process issues, and methodological issues.
Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that future
turnaround research could be enhanced by examining the
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resources of the declining organizations.

Specifically

the role of core competencies in organizational turnaround
and the role of retrenchment in obtaining the appropriate
supporting resources have been identified as opportunities
for research.

However, an organization's resources

include anything that can be thought of as a strength or
weakness of an organization (Wernerfelt, 1984); indeed,
resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational
processes, firm attributes, information, and knowledge
controlled by an organization (Barney, 1991).

Thus, the

implications of resources on an organization's ability to
turn its performance around may be quite broad.

To date,

top management groups are the only resource that has
received some attention (e.g., Bibeault, 1982; Hofer,
1980; O'Neill, 1986a).

Hence, other resources, such as

culture, seem ripe for investigation.

For example,

researchers could investigate how an organization's
identity (the way an organization's members see it -Dutton & Dukerich,

1991) influences a declining

organization's interpretation of its declining performance
and its subsequent actions.

Indeed, organizational

identity may offer reconciliation between two competing
perspectives on the actions of declining organizations.
Prospect theory predicts that organizations will choose
risky actions in response to poor performance (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, 1982) ; in contrast, the threat-rigidity
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thesis predicts organizations will choose conservative
actions (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) .

Thus, these

two perspectives predict opposite reactions to the same
strategic issue.

Because organizational identity shapes

issue interpretation and influences subsequent actions
(Dutton

Sc

Dukerich, 1991; Fiol, 1991) , divergent

organizational identities may partly explain why some
organizations act riskily, as prospect theory would
predict, or conservatively as the threat-rigidity thesis
would suggest.

Organizations who see themselves as risk-

takers may interpret poor performance as an opportunity
and take risky actions that are consistent with their
identities.

In contrast, organizations who see themselves

as conservative may view poor performance as a threat and
act in conservative ways that are consistent with their
identities.
The role of organizational identity in organizational
turnaround may prove to be quite important.

A declining

organization's identity was developed in the past (Dutton
& Dukerich, 1991); hence, its present interpretations of,
and actions in response to, strategic issues are deeply
rooted in the past

(Milliken & Lant, 1991) .

However,

changing times may require different interpretations and
actions

(Zimmerman, 19 86).

Thus, the challenge for

declining organizations may be doing things that are "out
of character. "
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Although the strategy process variables examined in
this study did not appear to be determinants of
organizational performance, there are other strategy
process issues that could be examined.

For example,

conflict among decision makers tends to increase in
declining organizations

(Cameron, Whetten & Kim, 1987).

Recent research has found that there are two types of
conflict: 1)affective, which is conflict based on
personality issues and is dysfunctional; and, 2)
cognitive, which is based on disagreement about ideas and
is functional (Amason, 199 6) .

Future research could

examine the impact of both types of conflict on
organizational decline and turnaround.

Cognitive and

affective conflict are significantly correlated in non
declining organizations (Amason, 1996).

If this

relationship holds for declining organizations, managers
must walk a tightrope balancing the benefits of
encouraging open discussion about ways to address the
decline against the tendency of these open discussions to
turn into personality conflicts.
Another strategy process issue worthy of attention is
interpretation of the environment.

Divergence between

obj ective and perceptual measures of the environment is
more prevalent for low-performing firms than for highperforming firms (Boyd, Dess & Rasheed, 1993).

Hence,

would appear that there is a relationship between poor
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performance and inaccuracy in interpretation of
environments.

Accurate interpretation of the environment

is key to an organization's success (Boyd, Dess & Rasheed,
1993), thus inaccurate interpretation may cause low
performance.

However, low performance may also cause

inaccurate interpretation.

Because low performance is not

self-enhancing, organizational decision makers may ignore
it and instead look for environmental factors that confirm
their understanding of the environment
19 82) .

Hence,

(Kiesler & Sproull,

it would appear the relationship between

accurate interpretation of the environment and low
performance may be cyclical; inaccurate perceptions of the
environment promote poor performance, and poor performance
promotes inaccurate perceptions of the environment.

If

this relationship is indeed cyclical, research might focus
on how decision makers can break the downward cycle.
Finally, the conceptualization and measurement of
turnaround performance deserves future research attention.
Performance is a key construct in the discipline (Meyer,
1991), and especially in turnaround studies
Prescott, 1986) .

(Venkatraman &

Although most turnaround studies have

focused solely on financial outcomes (Hoffman, 1989) , this
study measured all three types of performance (financial,
operational, and effectiveness -- Venkatraman & Ramanujam,
1986) .

However, as shown in Table 5-3, the correlations

between the effectiveness and the operational and
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financial measures of performance are extremely low.

The

reasons for divergence between these measures of
performance are unknown.

However, divergence of these

measures should be viewed as an opportunity; lack of
convergence should spur efforts at reconciliation, and can
be an opportunity for enhancing our understanding of a
phenomenon (Jick, 1979).
Reconciliation of the measures could follow two
paths; one is methodological, and the other is conceptual
(Venkatraman & Prescott, 1986).

Along the methodological

path, perhaps the financial and operational measures
should have been measured with a different time frame, or
the effectiveness outcomes may have been subject to
retrospective errors

(Golden, 1992) .

The implications of

this path are rather mild; as researchers, we may need to
refine our methods for measuring turnaround performance.
Alternatively, the explanation may lay along
conceptual paths.

Perhaps practitioners and researchers

conceptualize and assess performance differently.

In

contrast to the relatively mild implications of the
methodological path, the research implications of this
path go to the very heart of this research stream.
Performance is a construct that is central to this
research stream.

Thus, it is critical that researchers

understand the nature of this construct.

One of the

discipline's tenets is that research should have ultimate
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application to the problems of managers
Wernerfelt & Balakrishnan, 1989).

(Montgomery,

The discipline has

nothing to tell practitioners about how to improve their
organization's performance until it determines that
researchers and managers are talking about the same issue
in the same language.
Conclusion
This study sought to illustrate the importance of
achieving two types of fit to restoring declining
performance.

The two types of fit were: 1) fit between

strategy content and strategy process; and, 2) fit between
strategy and cause of decline.
Past research has shown that fit between strategy
content and process leads to higher performance

(Ketchen,

Thomas & McDaniel, 1996; Miles, Snow, Meyer & Coleman,
1978) .

Thus, this study posited that organizations that

matched their strategy with the appropriate level of
centralization of decision making and information usage
would experience positive performance.
Past research has also demonstrated that fit between
the recovery strategy and cause of decline leads to higher
performance

(Robbins & Pearce, 1992).

However, extant

research examined inductively-derived causes of decline.
This study theoretically derived the cause of decline from
the open-systems paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1966), and posited
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an organization's performance would be enhanced by
matching their strategy with the causes of decline.
Strategy content and process, cause of decline, and
performance data from 1987 to 1994 were collected for 66
hospitals.

Moderated multiple regression failed to

support the positive performance implications of either
type of fit.

Various potential explanations for the lack

of support for the positive performance implications of
fit were offered.

These explanations included: 1) the

choice of strategy is not crucial to turnaround
performance; 2) the two types of fit are necessary but not
sufficient for enhanced performance; 3) turnaround
processes are too idiosyncratic to generalize; and 4) a
conceptualization of fit other than the one posited in
this study may be more appropriate.
As with all studies, this study suffered from some
limitations.

These limitations included, the number of

respondents per organization, limited statistical power,
limited generalizability of the results, potential
retrospective and survival biases, and untested feedback
loops.
Although this study's hypotheses were not supported,
there are many related issues to be researched.

These

include the roles of the environment, organizational
resources, and other strategy processes in organizational
turnaround.

Further, the discrepancy between archival and
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perceptual measures of performance noted in this study,
illustrates the need for researchers to better understand
the dependent variable in turnaround studies.
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APPENDIX A: COVER LETTER

February 20, 1996

Mr. John Smithhisler
Chief Executive Officer
Sunbelt Regional Medical Center
13111 East Freeway
Houston, TX 77015
Dear Mr. Smithhisler:
As a result of changes in the hospital industry over the last decade an
increasing number of hospitals have experienced financial challenges.
However, to date, the topic of how hospitals respond to financial challenges
has not been studied adequately.
Your hospital is one of a small number in which managers are being asked
to describe both their hospital's response to financial challenges and the
manner in which that response was developed and implemented. This survey will
be used to develop recoamendations for improving hospital performance, but
will not be used for consulting activities.
In order that the results truly
represent the actions of hospitals that have faced financial challenges, each
questionnaire should be completed and returned.
The questionnaire should take
approximately 15 m inutes to complete.
It is important that the questionnaires
be completed by two managers who have been at the hospital since 1990. Thus,
please have the two highest-level managers (including yourself, if applicable)
that have been at the hospital since 1990 complete this questionnaire.
You and the o t h e r respondent (s) may be assured of confidentiality.
The
questionnaire has an identification number for mailing purposes only. T his
is
so chat we may check the hospital's name off
of Che mailing list when the
questionnaires are returned.
If you are one of the respondents, you may receive a summary of the
results by writing "copy of results requested* on the back of the return
envelope, and printing your name and address
b-’low it.
Please do not put this
information on the questionnaire icself.
If you are not one of the
•respondents, then y o u m a y receive a summary of the results by writing me.
I would be m o s t happy to answer any questions you might have.
Please
write or call. My telephone number is (504) 388-6212.
Thank you for your
assistance.
Sincerely.

Chris Shook
Project Director
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE

A STUDY OF HOW HOSPITALS RESPOND
TO FINANCIAL CHALLENGES
O verview

This survey is designed to investigate how
hospitals respond to financial challenges. The goal
of this research is to b etter understand how
hospitals react to changes in financial performance
and develop recom m endations for hospitals facing
financial challenges.
Answering this survey d o esn ’t involve research
on your part and will take approximately fifteen
m inutes. Your timely resp o n se to this survey is
im portant to the su c c e ss of this effort.
College of Business
Departm ent of Management
Louisiana State University
Baton, Rouge, LA 70803-6312

BUI
LSU
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A Study of How H ospitals Respond
to Financial Challenges
This study exam ines the re sp o n se s of hospitals to financial challenges. It seeks to (11 identify the types
of strategies hospitals used in an attem pt to improve performance, and (21 gain an understanding of factors
influencing strategic decisions. To gain a better understanding of the factors influencing strategic
decisions you will be asked questions about: (II the nature o f your hospital's response: (21 the m anner in
w hich yo u r hospital's re sp o n se w a s developed and im plem ented; (3) the reason for recent financial
challenges; and. (4) the ch ara cte ristics of your hospital.
This survey is being used for purposes of research only a n d individual survey resp o n ses will be strictly
confidential. The identification num ber on the survey is only u se d for mailing purposes. Sum m ary results
of this stu d y wilt be m ade available to those participants w h o desire them .
This su rv e y u se s the term "financial challenges* to refer to th e performance indicated by the low or
negative return on assets ratio. A financial summary of the y e a rs 1988-1994 has been included below for
your refe re n ce . This sum m ary w a s derived from your M edicare C ost Reports and w a s obtained from the
Center for Healthcare Industry Performance Studies. Please ta k e a m om ent to review this sum m ary before
com pleting th is survey.
Your cooperation is sincerely appreciated.

450126
Sun Belt Regional Medical C enter
Financial Summary 1988-199.4
1988
1989

1990

1991

Return on A ssets

3.67%

-0.390%

-5.256%

0 .7 7 6 %

Operating Margin

7.08.%

-0.702%

-7.845%

2 88 %

28 .4 9 1 %

25.180%

24.214%

O ccupancy

27.89%

C ost Per Discharge

$3811.43.

$ 3 8 6 8 .3 2

$3891.99

$ 3 8 9 6 .9 6

Salary Per
Full-Time Employee

$33483.03.

$ 3 1 5 8 4 .3 0

$22911.60

$21 1 13.77

1992

1993

1994

Return on A ssets

6 .9 8 2 %

12.481%

18.773%

Operating Margin

7 .1 1 4 %

11.272%

10.642%

2 2 .2 8 3 %

42.512%

2 3.819%

O ccupancy
C ost Per Discharge

$ 3 9 3 5 .4 0

$4474.42

$34 8 9 .1 5

Salary Per
Full-Time Employee

$ 2 2 8 6 8 .7 6

$25003.68

$ 1 9 1 0 9 .4 2

d e n o te s missing d a ta
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I)

THE NATURE OF YOUR HOSPITAL'S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES

Q1. To w ha( e x te n t did your hospital re sp o n d to the financial challenges (i.e.. low or negative return
on asse ts) by ....
(circle your answ er)
To a: Small
G reat
Extent
Extent
1 2
5
1. developing n e w p a tie n t bases?
1
2. introducing innovative medical se rv ice s?
5
1
5
3. expanding th e range of medical se rv ic e s offered?
1
4. acquiring n e w m edical technology to a ttra c t patients?
5
1
5. serving existing p a tie n t bases m ore efficiently?
5
1
6. offering existing m edical services m o re efficiently?
5
1
7. limiting th e ra n g e of services offered?
5

II)

HO W THE HOSPITAL'S RESPONSE WAS DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED

0 2 . W hen developing and im plem enting your organization's response to the financial challenges, to
w hat extent:
(circle y o u r answ er)
To a: Small
G reat
Extent
Extent
1. did one or tw o top hospital m an a g ers dom inate decision making?
1 2 3 4 5
did all m em b ers o f th e hospital's to p m anagem ent make strategic
2.
decisions o n a regular basis?
1 2 3 4 5
3.
w a s auth o rity for making strategic d e cisio n s shared by all
to p m an ag ers?
1 2 3 4 5
4.
did e x ec u tiv e s at th e hospital's c o rp o ra te p arent make
strategic d e cisio n s for your hospital?
N/A 1 2 3 4 5
5.
did all top m an a g ers share responsibility for strategic decisions?
1 2 3 4 5
6.
could decision making authority be characterized as shared am ong
1 2 3 4 5
all top m an ag ers?
7.
w as stra te g ic decision making c h aracterized by the "push and pull*
of different in te re s ts (e.g., ad m in istrato rs, physicians)?
1 2 3 4 5
8.
w as conflict a n a cc ep te d outcom e o f stra te g ic decision making?
1 2 3 4 5
9.
could s tra te g ic decision making in y o u r hospital be characterized
a s bargaining, negotiating, and com prom ising?
1 2 3 4 5
10. did coalitions am ong to p m anagers c h a n g e over different strategic
issues?
1 2 3 4 5
11. w as there a sy ste m a tic search for inform ation during strategic
decision m aking?
1 2 3 4 5
12. w as anger am o n g top m anagers w ith e ac h other evident?
1 2 3 4 5
13. w as there perso n al friction am ong g ro u p m em bers?
1 2 3 4 5
14. w ere p ersonality d a s h e s am ong g ro u p m em bers evident?
1 2 3 4 5
15. w a s ten sio n w ithin th e group evident?
1 2 3 4 5
16. w ere th ere d isa g ree m e n ts over differen t ideas about how to improve
perform ance?
1 2 3 4 5
17. w ere th ere m an y differences of opinion a b o u t how to address the
finandal challenges?
1 2 3 .4 5
18. did top m an a g ers have to work th ro u g h m any differences regarding
the h o sp ita l's stra te g y ?
1 2 3 4 5

2
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□ 3 . W hen developing and im plem enting y our re sp o n se to the financial challenges, to w h a t e x te n t
did you use the following so u rc es o f inform ation?
(circle your answ er)
To a: Small
G reat
Extent
E xtent
1.
internal financial reports
1 2 3 4 5
2.
internal operating re p o n s
1 2 3 4 5
3.
discussions am ong top m a n a g e rs
1 2 3 4 5
4.
discussions am ong o th er e m p lo y e es
1 2 3 4 5
5.
other so u rc es internal to the h o sp ital
1 2 3 4 5
6.
n ew spaper articles
1 2 3 4 5
7.
healthcare journals
1 2 3 4 5
8.
governm ent sta tistics
1 2 3 4 5
9.
cham ber of com m erce sta tistic s
1 2 3 4 5
10. m arketing surveys
1 2 3 4 5
11. discussions w ith industry e x p e rts
1 2 3 4 5
12. discussions w ith c o n su ltan ts
1 2 3 4 5
13. m anaged care vendors
1 2 3 4 5
14. o th er hospitals o w n ed by th e s a m e m ulti-hospital sy ste m
N/A
1 2 3 4 5
15. o th er so u rces external to th e h o sp ita l
1 2
3 4 5
Q 4. Durina the h o so ital's o erfo rm a n ce decline, h o w im o o n an t were each of the follow ing
perform ance com parisons in form ulating y our stra te g ic response?
( d r d e yo u r answ er)
Very
Very
Unimportant
Im portant
C om parison with ...
1. your h ospital's p a st perform ance
2.
short-term perform ance a sp iratio n s of th e hospital
3.
long-term perform ance a sp iratio n s o f th e hospital
N/A
4 . hospitals in your m ulti-hospital s y s te m
5 . average perform ance in th e in d u s try nationw ide
6 . hospitals located in your co m m u n ity
7. hospitals th a t com pete in a w a y sim ilar to you
8 . hospitals experiencing similar p e rfo rm a n ce to yours
Looking beyond the health care in d u stry , ho w im portant w ere com parisons w ith...
9.
firms in o ther service industries w ith in your com m unity
1 2
10. local service firms experiencing sim ilar perform ance to yours
1 2
1 1. highly reputable organizations d e sc rib e d in th e m edia
1 2
12. firms m anaged by people you k n o w socially or professionally
1 2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

For each of the pairs below , please divide 1 0 0 points am ong the following according to h nv
im portant they w ere as com parators in evaluating your hospital's perform ance?
1.

a . your hosp ital's p a s t p erfo rm an ce___________________________________ ____
b. your h ospital's long-term p e rfo rm a n ce aspirations
____

100
2.

a. your h o sp ital's p a s t perform ance
b. the perform ance of other h o sp ita ls

100
3.

a. the perform ance of o ther h o sp itals
b. the perform ance of firms o u ts id e th e health care industry
100
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Q 5. A t th e p re se n t tim e, how im portant a rc e a c h of th e following com parisons w hen evaluating
w h e th er o r n o t your hospital's perform ance is at a n acceptable level?
(circle your answ er!
Very
Very
Unimportant
Im portant
C om parison w ith ...
1 2 3 4 5
t.
y o u r h o sp ita l's p ast perform ance
1 2 3 4 5
2.
sh o rt-te rm perform ance aspirations of th e hospital
1 2 3 4 5
3.
lo n g -term perform ance aspirations of th e hospital
N/A
1 2 3 4 5
4.
h o sp ita ls in your multi-hospital sy ste m
1 2 3 4 5
5.
a v e ra g e perform ance in th e industry n a tio n w id e
I 2 3 4 5
6.
h o sp ita ls located in your com m unity
1 2 3 4 5
7.
h o sp ita ls th a t com pete in a w ay sim ilar to you
1 2 3 4 5
8.
h o sp ita ls experiencing similar p e rfo rm a n ce to yo u rs
Looking b e y o n d th e health care industry, h o w im p o rta n t are com parisons with..
1 2
firm s in o th e r service industries w ithin y o u r com m unity
9.
1 2
10. local service firms experiencing sim ilar p e rfo rm a n ce to yours
1 2
11. highly rep u tab le organizations d e sc rib e d in th e m edia
1 2
12. firm s m an ag ed by people you know socially o r professionally

3
3
3
3

4 5
4 •5
4 5
4 5

For e a c h o f th e pairs below, please divide 1 0 0 p o in ts am ong th e following according to how
im p o rta n t th e y a re. a t present, a s c o m p a ra to rs in evaluating your h ospital's perform ance?
1.

a. y o u r h o sp ita l's past perform ance
b . y o u r h o sp ita l's long-term p e rfo rm an ce aspirations

____
____

100
2.

a. y o u r h o sp ita l's past perform ance
b. th e perform ance of other hospitals

3.

a. th e perform ance of other hospitals
b. th e perform ance of firms outside th e health care industry

____
____

100

III)

Q6

THE CAUSE OF THE HOSPITAL'S FINANCIAL CHALLENGES

P lease c o n sid er the cause(s) of th e financial challenges. Rate th ese factors from 1 to 5 in such
i fash io n a s to indicate th e causation of th e h o sp ital's financial challenges. (1 extrem ely
u n im p o rta n t. 5-extrcmely im portant)
C o s t o r availability of reso u rce s (e .g .. sta ff, supplies, etc.)
Internal p ro c esses and operations (e .g ., inefficiency, quality problems)
D em and for services offered (e.g., lo w dem and for services, new competitors in com m unity,
e tc .)
R ed u ced reim bursem ent ra te s
In c re a se d m arket penetration of m a n a g e d care activities
4
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Q7. To w h a t e x te n t w ere the following facto rs a sso c iated w ith the hosp ital's financial challenges
(i.e. lo w or n egative n et income)?
(circle your answ er!
To a: Small
G reat
Extent
Extent
1 2 3 4 5
high lab o r c o s ts
1.
1 2 3 4 5
s c a r c e supply of admitting doctors
2.
1 2 3 4 5
high p ric e s of supplies
3.
1 2 3 4 5
4.
s c a rc e su p p ly o f nurses
1 2 3 4 5
m isd ire c te d gro w th
5.
1 2 3 4 5
6.
inefficient operations
7.
1 2 3 4 5
in a d e q u a te c o s t controls
1 2 3 4 5
8.
in a d e q u a te quality controls
1 2 3 4 5
9.
m e rg e r of com p etito rs
1 2 3 4 5
10. c o m p e tito rs ' n e w service offerings
1 2 3 4 5
11. n e w c o m p e tito rs in the comm unity
1 2 3 4 5
11. c h a n g e d com m unity dem ographics (e.g.. aging population)
1 2 3 ,4 5
12. low d e m a n d for service offerings
1 2 3 4 5
13. in c re a s e in unreim bursed services

VI) YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE HOSPITAL'S SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCE
Q 8. In g e n e ra l, h o w w ould you rate ...

1. the e ffe c tiv e n e s s of your hospital's re sp o n se to
2. th e c u rre n t perform ance of your hospital?

(circle your answ er)
Very
Very
Poor
Good
th e financial decline?
12 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

VIII) OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Q 9. P le ase circle th e w ord which b e st describes your hospital:
ACUTE SPECIALTY TERTIARY
Q 10. W h at y ear did your hospital join Columbia/HCA H ealthcare C o rp o ra tio n ? _______
Q 1 1. W h a t y e ar w a s your hospital fo u n d e d ? _______
Q 1 2. H ow m an y y e ars have you been at this hospital?_________________________
Q 13. W h a t is your title/position?___________________________________________
Q 1 4 . W h a t y e ar w e re you b o m ? ________
Q 15. H ow m an y y e ars of experience do you have in the h ealthcare in d u s try ? ____
Q 16. P le a s e circle th e word(s) which b e st d esc rib e s your ex p ertise:
ACCOUNTING/FINANCE MARKETING OPERATIONS/MANAGEMENT

CLINICAL

Is th e r e anyth in g else you would like to tell u s about how y our hospital responded to the
financial c h allen g e s? If so . please u se the back of this page for this p u rp o se. Any co m m en ts you
w ish to m a k e th a t y o u think may help us in future efforts to u n d e rsta n d how hospitals respond to
financial c h a lle n g e s will be appreciated. Your contribution to th is effort is very greatly appreciated.
5
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APPENDIX C: REMINDER POSTCARD

February 2 6 , 1 9 9 6
Last w eek a questionnaire asking h ow your hospital responded to
financial challenges w a s sent to you.
If your hospital has already com pleted and returned it to us today, please
accept our sincere thanks. If not, please do so tod ay. B ecause it has
been sen t to only a small sample o f hospitals, it is extrem ely important
that yours also be included in the study if the results are to accurately
represent hospitals that have faced financial challen ges.
If by som e chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got
misplaced, please call m e right n ow (5 0 4 -3 8 8 -6 2 1 2 ), and I will get
another one in the mail to you today.
Sipcerely,

/

Chris Shook
Project Director
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APPENDIX D: COVER LETTER FOR SECOND MAILING

March

11, 1996

Mr. Joh n S m i t h h i s l e r
Chief Executive O fficer
S u n b e l t Regional Medical C e n t e r
13111 East Fr e e w a y
Houston, TX
77015
D e a r Mr. Smithhisler:
I nee d your help!
About t h r e e w e e k s ago I wrote to you a s k i n g
h o w yo u r hospital had r e s p o n d e d to financial challenges.
As of
today, your c o m p l e t e d q u e s t i o n n a i r e s have not been received.
Yo u r hospital's response is v i t a l to the success of this r e s e a r c h
p r o j e c t and, on a personal note, to the completion of my
d i s s e r t a t i o n a n d m y doctorate in management.
I a m writing to you again b e c a u s e of the significance each
qu e s t i o n n a i r e has to the u s e f u l n e s s of this study.
Your hospital
was selected t h r o u g h a s a m p l i n g p r o c e s s in which only one in
forty two h o s p itals are b e i n g a s k e d to describe their h o s pital's
resp o n s e to financial challenges.
In order chat the results
tr uly represent the actions of hospitals chat have faced
financial challenges, ea c h h o s p i t a l in the sample needs to
respond.
As m e n t i o n e d in the last letter, the questionnaires
s h o u l d be c o m p l e t e d by m a n a g e r s w h o have been at the hospital
s i n c e 1990.
Thus, please h a v e the two highest-level managers
(including yourself, if a p p licable) that have been at the
h o s p i t a l since 1990 complete this q u e s t i o n n a i r e .
In the event that your q u e s t i o n n a i r e s have been misplaced,
replacements a r e enclosed.
Y o u r assistance is greatly apprec i a t e d .
Sincerely,

Chris Shook
Project Director
P.S. A number of people have w r i t t e n to ask when results of this
s t u d y will be available.
I hop e to have them out in May.
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APPENDIX E: FAX COVER SHEET FOR THIRD ITERATION

D ep artm en t of M anagem ent
College of Business A dm inistration
Louisiana S ta te University
B aton Rouge. LA 7 0 8 0 3 -6 3 1 2

Facsim ile C o rre sp o n d e n c e

A p ril___ . 1996

To: Mr. S te p h e n Royal. President and CEO
Spring Branch M edical C enter 4 5 0 6 3 0
Fax#: (713) 7 2 2 -3 7 8 0

From : Chris S h o o k - P roject Director
Fax ff: (5 0 4 ) 3 8 8 -6 1 4 0
Tele ff: (5 0 4 ) 3 8 8 -6 2 1 2
N um ber of P a g e s: 7 (including this cover sheet)
M essag e :
I am c o n ta c tin g you a b o u t m y study of how h o sp itals resp o n d to financial challenges.
I h av e n o t y e t receiv ed a your com pleted q u estionnaire.
This is th e first stu d y of this type th a t h as ever b e e n d o n e. T herefore, the results are
of particular im p o rtan ce to m any hospital ex ecu tiv e s. H ow ever, the usefulness of the
resu lts d ep e n d on h o w accurately I am able to d escrib e h o w hospitals responded to
financial c h a lle n g e s. P a st experience su g g ests th a t th o se hospitals which have not
y e t resp o n d e d m ay h av e acted quite differently th a n th o se w hich have. Thus, your
input is critical to th e s u c c e s s of this study, and, on a personal n o te, to the completion
of m y d o cto ral d issertatio n .
It is for th e s e re a s o n s th a t I am sending this by facsim ile. In case my other
c o rre sp o n d e n c e did n o t reach you, a replacem ent questionnaire is also being sen t.
May I urge you to h a v e a m anager th a t h as been th ere since 1 9 9 0 take fifteen m inutes
to co m p lete it to d a y and fax it back to me at (504) 3 8 8 -6 1 4 0 ?
Your co n trib u tio n to th e s u c c e ss of this study will be ap p reciated greatly.
Confidentiality Notice
This facsimile transmission and the documents accoopanying it cay contain wort product and/or privileged and
confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above, tf the reader of
this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copy
of this telecopy is strictly prohibited. If you have received this telecopy in error, please iamcdiately notify
us by telephone and return the original message to us at the above via the United States Postal Service. Thank
you.
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APPENDIX F: COVER LETTER FOR FOURTH MAILING
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A udubon Regional
Medical C enter
June 10, 1996
Mr. John Smithhisler,
Chief Executive Officer
Sunbelt Regional Medical Center
13111 East Freeway
Houston, TX 77015
Dear Mr. Smithhisler
Researchers at Louisiana State University have undertaken a research project to
better understand how hospitals respond to financial challenges. The goal of
this research is to construct a model of strategic responses to declining financial
performance and develop recommendations for hospitals facing financial
challenges. As you may know, your hospital was included in the sample and
mailed a survey a few weeks ago, but your completed survey has not been
received.
As Chief Executive Officer at Audubon Regional Medical Center, I know that
there are many demands on your time. However, may I ask a favor? If you
have been at this hospital since 1990, please take the dollar bill attached to the
enclosed survey and go buy yourself a coke to drink while taking a few minutes
to complete the enclosed questionnaire. If you haven't been there since 1990,
please pass it along to one of your managers who has and ask them to complete
it. When finished, return the survey in the enclosed postage-paid envelope.
I greatly appreciate your help.
Sincerely,

Michael L. Louviere
President and Chief Executive Officer
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